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The Blue Devil's In The Details:





Everyone involved in the business of major college athletics, except the
athletes, receives compensation based on afree market system. The Nation-
al Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) cap on athlete compensation
1. The title comes partly from the phrase, "[T]he devil is in the details," which means the details
of an endeavor can be extremely problematic. The Devil is in the Details, OXFORD LIVING
DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/the devil is in the details (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2018). The title also includes a reference to Duke University's mascot, the Blue Devil,
which is named after French soldiers in World War I who wore a "distinctive blue uniform with
flowing cape and [a] jaunty beret." The Story of the Blue Devil, GODUKE, http://www.goduke.com
/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=2423 33 (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5B72-UBJJ]. The
title befits the Article, as the author graduated from Duke University School of Law and the Duke
men's basketball program remains one of the most successful and lucrative programs in the country.
This Article proposes that men's college basketball players and football players should be allowed to
earn compensation for playing.
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; Rice University, B.A.; Duke Uni-
versity School of Law, J.D. Professor Grenardo was a four-year letterman for the Rice University
football team. The author would like to thank sports law professor and scholar Glenn Wong, Distin-
guished Professor of Practice (Sports Law) at Arizona State Law School and Director of its Sports
Law and Business Program, and sports law professor and scholar, Walt Champion, the George
Foreman Professor of Law at Thurgood Marshall School of Law, for providing invaluable insight
and comments on an earlier draft. The author would also like to thank the faculty members of Thur-
good Marshall School of Law, who attended the author's presentation of this article as a part of the
Southern Central Association of Law Schools (SCALS) Faculty Speaker Series, for their hospitality
and feedback. The author would also like to thank sports law professor Don E. Gibson and his Ama-
teur Sports Law class at Arizona State Law School for an engaging and stimulating discussion about
this article. This article would not have been possible without the work of the author's current and
former research assistants: Cali Franks, Rene Burnias, Lourdes Vela, Martha Salas, Savannah Files,
Shaunte Collins, Harry Church, Paige Andabaker, and Austin Laws (St. Mary's University School of
Law J.D. Candidates). The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and any mistakes,
errors, or omissions are solely attributable to the author.
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violates antitrust law, and athletes should be allowed to earn their free mar-
ket value as everyone else does in this country. This Article provides a de-
tailed approach to compensating college athletes under afree market model,
which includes a salary cap, the terms of a proposed standard player 's con-
tract, a discussion of who can represent players, and payment simulations
for football and basketball teams. A free market approach would not only
be feasible, but it would likely improve the product on the field and the
court, as well as the lives of those college athletes who provide the labor for
major college athletics, which is currently an $11 billion-a-year industry.
204
[Vol. 46: 203, 2019] The Blue Devil's In The Details
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 206
II. THE NCAA's PROHIBITION ON ATHLETES EARNING SALARIES
VIOLATES ANTITRUST LAW .......................................... 212
A. The NCAA Forbids College Athletes from Profiting Based
on the Sport They Play ............................ 212
B. Courts Apply Antitrust Law Via the Sherman Act o Major
College Athletics ......................... ....... 214
C. O'Bannon Found an Antitrust Violation But Fell Short..........217
D. The NCAA 's Prohibition on Athlete Compensation Violates
Antitrust Law as Jenkins Currently Seeks..... .......... 221
III. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF A FREE MARKET APPROACH IN
MAJOR COLLEGE SPORTS. ................................ ............ 223
A. College Athletes Are Employees ...................... 224
B. Hard Salary Cap ................. ....................226
1. Football Salary Cap: $3 Million .......................229
2. Men's College Basketball Salary Cap: $500,000 .............. 232
C. Standard Player's Contract ................... ..... 233
1. Essential Tenns for Universities and Colleges..................234
2. Essential Tenns for Athletes ..................... 235
3. Essential Tenns for Both Parties...................235
D. Free Market Simulations. .................. ......... 238
1. Football ............................ ..... 238
2. Basketball. ............................... 243
E. Determining Who Can Represent College Athletes.................246
F Advantages of a Free Market Model.......................248
IV. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE FREE MARKET MODEL ............. 251
A. Title IX Prevents Paying Only Football and Men's College
Basketball Players .......................... ..... 252
B. The Free Market Model Calculations Should Include
Scholarship Values...............................253
V. CONCLUSION....................................................253
APPENDIX A ........................................................ 254
APPENDIX B................................... ....... 265
205
[Vol. 46: 203, 2019] The Blue Devil's In The Details
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he labor of student-athletes is an integral and essential component
of the NCAA's 'product,' and a rule setting the price of that labor goes to
the heart of the NCAA's business."2 The Ninth Circuit made this obvious
proclamation in the O'Bannon litigation and determined the NCAA's rule on
compensation for college athletes violated antitrust law, but then it set an ar-
tificial and inappropriate limit on what compensation college athletes can
earn.3
In O'Bannon, plaintiffs included college football players and men's
basketball players who sought compensation for the use of their names, im-
ages, and likenesses in, among other things, video games.4 After deternin-
ing the NCAA's rule on compensation for college athletes constituted an an-
titrust violation, the district court granted two permanent injunctions wherein
the NCAA could not prevent its member institutions from providing college
athletes with (1) full cost of attendance scholarships and (2) up to $5,000 in
shared revenue after graduation.5 Three judges on the Ninth Circuit (herein-
after the "Ninth Circuit"), after upholding the district court's ruling that the
NCAA's compensation rules violated antitrust law, affirmed the district
2. O'Bannonv. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015).
3. Id. at 1079; infra note 5 and accompanying text.
4. See O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1052 (9th Cir. 2015) ("For more than a century, the [NCAA] has
prescribed rules governing the eligibility of athletes. ... Those rules prohibit student-athletes from
being paid for the use of their names, images, and likenesses. . .").
5. The district court concluded that he NCAA's rules constituted an unreasonable restraint o
trade in violation of the Sherman Act. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D. Cal.
2014), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). "Consistent with the less
restrictive alternatives found, the Court will enjoin the NCAA from enforcing any rules or bylaws
that would prohibit its member schools and conferences from offering their FBS football or Division
I basketball recruits a limited share of the revenues generated from the use of their names, images,
and likeness in addition to a full grant-in-aid." Id. at 1007-08. Traditional grant-in-aid scholarships
cover tuition, room, books, and board. Id. at 971. Full cost of attendance scholarships cover the gap
between grant-in-aid scholarships and the full cost of attendance that can include, among other
things, transportation to and from school, miscellaneous personal expenses, and administrative fees,
the total of which can range between $2,000 and $5,000 per athlete. See Michelle B. Hosick, Auton-
omy Schools Adopt Cost ofAttendance Scholarships, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015, 6:58 AM), http://www.
ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomy-schools-adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships
[https://perma.cc/8M6B-MPZ9] (discussing the rule adopted through autonomy that allows schools
to provide scholarships that cover the full cost of attendance); see also Brian Bennett, NCAA Board
Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2014), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/ /id/
1132155 1/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy-five-power-conferences [https://perma.cc/M4GK-
DHRM] (stating "the full cost-of-attendance stipends ... could be worth between $2,000 and $5,000
per player").
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court's order permitting full cost of attendance scholarships, but it vacated
the other injunction granting the NCAA's member institutions the ability to
compensate its athletes with deferred compensation up to $5,000 per year.6
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the $5,000 was "untethered to educational
expenses" and, therefore, impermissible.' Thus, the Ninth Circuit allowed
college athletes to earn compensation up to the full cost of attendance but
prohibited compensation above that line because amounts above that line are
"untethered to educational expenses."8
No one else involved with college athletics-besides college athletes-
faces limits on what they can earn based on how closely their compensation
is tied to education. The Ninth Circuit's holding acknowledges that the
NCAA's rules prohibiting compensation constitute an antitrust violation, but
it fails to level the playing field for all of the stakeholders participating in the
multibillion-dollar business of college athletics.9 Coaches, athletic depart-
ment personnel, broadcasters, NCAA executives, and everyone else involved
reap the full rewards except the college athletes who provide the product on
the field and the court. 10
Major college athletics, which include the revenue-generating sports of
college football and men's basketball," have become an $11 billion-a-year
industry.12 College coaches make millions of dollars, many in salary alone,
6. O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
7. Id. at 1078. Plaintiffs' request for the Ninth Circuit to rehear the appeal en banc was denied.
See O'Bannonv. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), petitionfor ehg en banc denied, Nos. 14-
16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. 2015) (order denying rehearing en banc).
8. O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078.
9. See id. at 1066.
10. See William B. Gould IV et al., Full Court Press: Northwestern University, a New Challenge
to the NC4A, 35 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2014) (discussing the multibillion dollar industry of
men's college basketball and football); see also NCAA, 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL
§ 12.1.2 (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D116.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/RJ4Z-Y9XM] (providing that a college athlete becomes ineligible if one "[u]ses his or her
athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport") [hereinafter "NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL"]; Amy C. McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor's New Clothes:
Lifting the NCA 's Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496-97 (2008) (stating the
NCAA is a $60,000,000,000 industry); Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to
Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability ofIntercollegiate Athletics, 92
OR. L. REV. 837, 846-47 (2014) (addressing the multibillion-dollar industry of major college sports).
11. See Cork Gaines, The Average College Football Team Makes More Money Than the Next 25
College Sports Combined, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2016, 12:08 PM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/ college-sports-revenue-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/9BDF-KVGQ].
12. Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons Learned from
Northwestern University and Potential Next Steps in the College Athletes' Rights Movement, 38
CARDOZOL. REV. 1627, 1630-31 (2017).
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along with compensation for bonuses and endorsements.13 For example,
Coach John Calipari, head coach of the University of Kentucky's men's
basketball team, received a salary of $7,140,000 for the 2016-2017 season.4
Nick Saban, head coach of the University of Alabama's football team, en-
joyed a salary and compensation from the university of $11,132,000 for the
2017 season." Jimbo Fisher signed a $75 million contract to coach Texas
A&M over a ten-year period.16 College football coaches received over $12
million in bonuses for the 2015 season,17 while men's basketball coaches al-
so receive exorbitant bonuses, based primarily on the success of their
teams." Moreover, the former head coach of the Ohio State football team,
Urban Meyer, received $2,201,450 from Ohio State's endorsement deal with
Nike and television appearances on behalf of the team.19 Even assistant
13. Steve Berkowitz et. al, 2017 NCAAB Tournament Coaches' Pay, USA TODAY,
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/mens-basketball/coach/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/5ZWH-UYKP] [hereinafter NCAAB Tournament Coaches' Pay]; Steve Berkowitz et. al,
2017 NC4AF Coaches' Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries (last visited
Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/74VZ-YQ35] [hereinafter 2017 NC4AF Coaches' Salaries].
14. 2017 NCAAB Tournament Coaches'Pay, supra note 13.
15. 2017 NC4AF Coaches'Salaries, supra note 13.
16. Jimbo Fisher gets 10-years, $75 million deal at Texas A&M, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2017,
1:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2017/12/04/jimbo-fisher-gets-75-million-
deal-to-coach-texas-a-m/108304980/ [https://perma.cc/V9YT-MWR7].
17. Steven Berkowitz & Christopher Schnaars, College Football Coaches Piling Up More Cash
Through Bonuses, USA TODAY (Oct. 8, 2015, 12:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports
/ncaaf/2015/10/08/coaches-bonuses-gary-pinkel/73553784/ (discussing the $12.4 million total for
bonuses paid in 2015); see also College Football Coaches Salaries and Contracts, NEWSDAY,
https://projects.newsday.com/databases/long-island/college-football-coaches-salaries-
contracts/?where=conference=American%/2oAthletic&order-collegeDESC&offset=0 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CG3R-MAPC] (including 108 public schools' "basic salary details
along with the incentives and perks for each of these coaches"). For example, Utah State's Matt
Wells received $5,000 for his team's win over in-state rival BYU; P.J. Fleck's, the former head
coach of Western Michigan, bonus totaled $21,750 from his players' individual all-Mid-American
Conference team and academic honors; Boise State's Bryan Harsin, in addition to the bonuses called
for in his contract-which totaled $95,000 and covered the Broncos' appearance in the Fiesta
Bowl-received an additional $87,875 "for his success last season," according to a statement by his
athletics department spokesman Max Corbet. Id.
18. See Steven Berkowitz, As Always, Big Bonus Bucks in Store for Sweet 16 Coaches, USA
TODAY (Mar. 22, 2017, 2:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2017/03/22/sweet-
16-coaches-bonuses-march-madness/99494474/ [https://perma.cc/2JB9-TW3G] (detailing the bonus
opportunities for the 2017 Sweet 16 head coaches and stating bonuses are given to basketball coach-
es for team wins, conference titles, rank, and post-season wins for appearance in NCAA tournament,
Sweet 16, Elite Eight, Final Four, and NCAA title).
19. Urban Meyer Contract at Ohio State, NEWSDAY, http://sports.newsday.com/long-
island/data/college/college-football/coaches-salaries/urban-meyer/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/PY2X-ZTBG]; Ben Cohen & Sara Germano, Nike Reaches $252 Million Deal to Extend
208
[Vol. 46: 203, 2019] The Blue Devil's In The Details
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
coaches in men's college basketball and football receive extremely high sal-
aries, several in the seven-figure range with many in the six-figure range.20
Likewise, some athletic directors receive salaries and bonuses above $1
million. 21 Numerous NCAA executives receive six-figure salaries as well. 22
Schools also spend millions of dollars on facilities to attract college athletes,
when the schools should be paying the college athletes themselves.23
The incredible amount of revenue generated by major college athletics
led to the perplexing question faced by the University of Nebraska's athletic
department: what to do with an additional payout of $47 million "thanks to
[the University's] first year of full revenue sharing and a new television con-
tract" in the Big Ten Conference?24 Many commentators, both legal and
otherwise, possess the same answer to that difficult quandary faced by the
University of Nebraska's athletic department and athletic departments all
around the country-pay the athletes.25 This Article sets forth a detailed ap-
proach to compensating college athletes under the free market system. An
argument against paying college athletes has always been that it would be
too difficult and complicated to compensate college athletes. This argument
is absurd, as the United States economy is based on a free market system
where people earn what the market will bear. Universities employ hundreds
Sponsorship at Ohio State, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2016, 1:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/nike-reaches-252-million-deal-to-extend-sponsorship-at-ohio-state- 1452811305.
20. 2017 NCAAF Coaches' Salaries, upra note 13; Steve Berkowitz et. al, 2017 NC4AFAssis-
tant Coaches' Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/football/assistant (last
visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6TLF-2J3R].
21. 2017 NCAAF Coaches' Salaries, supra note 13; 2017 NCAAF Assistant Coaches' Salaries,
supra note 20; Steve Berkowitz et. al, 2017 NCAAF Strength Coaches' Salaries, USA TODAY,
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/football/strength (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma
.cc/9NCA-GHG9].
22. See Alex Kirshner, The Embattled Mark Emmert Will Be the NCA 's President for 3 More
Years, SB NATION (Feb. 1, 2016, 1:17 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2016/2/1/
10886996/mark-emmert-ncaa-president-contract-extension-salary ("In 2012, [NCAA President]
Emmert reportedly made $1.7 million. .. .").
23. Jason Gay, Stop Giving College Athletes Million-Dollar Locker Rooms. Start Paying Them,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2017, 12:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-giving-college-atletes-
million-dollar-locker-rooms-start-paying-them-1503075169 [https://perma.cc/T8RK-7WY9].
24. Steve Rosen, Awash in Big Ten Money, Nebraska Eyes Spending Opportunities,
HUSKERONLINE (Aug. 18, 2017), https://nebraska.rivals.com/news/awash-in-big-ten-money-neb
raska-eyes-spending-opportunities (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/X6JQ-2RYJ].
25. E.g., Michael Wilbon, College Athletes Deserve to Be Paid, ESPN (July 18, 2011),
http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/ /id/6778847/college-athletes-deserve-paid
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or thousands of individuals, including administrators, professors, and staff,
all of whom are paid according to what the market dictates.26 In major col-
lege athletics, everyone besides the athletes is compensated under the free
market system, and no cap, artificial or otherwise, restricts how much a
coach, athletic department administrator, NCAA executive, or broadcasting
personality can make.27 Athletes, given that they are creating the product
that generates the money for everyone else, while placing their long-term
health on the line (particularly in football),28 should also be allowed to re-
ceive compensation for their efforts under a free market system.29
Athletes are treated unlike everyone else at the university, including
other students. Student musicians, for example, can earn thousands of dol-
lars performing off campus at events affiliated with alumni or boosters with-
out losing the ability to perform in school events.30 The NCAA's current
rules prohibit college athletes from earning compensation based on playing
26. See, e.g., Negotiating Academic Job Offers, UNIV. NEB., http://www.unl.edu/gradstudies
/current/news/negotiating-academic-job-offers (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3P89-
J2RX] (providing tips and suggestions on how to negotiate an employment contract with a universi-
ty); see also Patricia Rogers & Sarah Drake, UT is Austin's Largest Employer, AUSTIN BUS. J. (Jun.
8, 2012, 12:27 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/austin/news/2012/06/08/ut-is-austins-largest-
employer.html [https://perma.cc/LY7D-BG2T] (indicating the University of Texas employed 21,626
people in 2012).
27. Robert A. McCormick & Amy C. McCormick, The Myth of The Student-Athlete: The College
Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 75-76 (2006) (recounting the lavish salaries of the
coaches as well as the huge revenues media corporations generate from broadcasting college events).
28. See Report: Georgetown RB Ty Williams Breaks Neck, Could Be Paralyzed, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 6, 2015),http://www.si.com/college-football/2015/09/06/georgetown-hoyas-ty-
williams-broken-neck [https://perma.cc/L5RW-NLBZ] (reporting that a running back for
Georgetown broke five bones in his neck and vertebrae); Mark Viera, Rutgers Player is Paralyzed
Below the Neck, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/sports/ncaafoot
ball/18rutgers.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/8P66-N932] (stating a Rutgers University defensive tack-
le was paralyzed after colliding with another player).
29. See supra note 28; see also A.J. Perez, Study: CTE Diagnosed in 990% ofFormer NFL Play-
ers Studied By Researchers, USA TODAY (July 25, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
nfl/2017/07/25/cte-diagnosed-99-percent-former-nfl-players-according-study/507634001/ [https://
perma.cc/A3AW-GB8Z] (discussing the frightening symptoms of CTE and the prevalence of CTE in
former football players); Sam Mellinger, Doctors Couldn't Find What Was Wrong with Michael
Keck, but Football Star Knew It Would Kill Him, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 21, 2015, 9:52 PM),
http://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columns-blogs/sam-mellinger/article458501 80.html [https://
perma.cc/88R9-C523] (recounting the death of a twenty-five-year-old football player that was diag-
nosed with CTE).
30. See Karen Crouse, When an Olympian Goes to College, Riches Stay Out of Reach, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/sports/olympics/katie-ledecky-
olympian-goes-to-college-riches-stay-out-of-reach.html?_r-2 ("The rules of amateurism that severe-
ly curb the earning potential of college student-athletes do not apply to college student musicians.").
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their sport.31 Jay Bilas, a lawyer and current ESPN basketball analyst, who
played basketball and later served as an assistant coach at Duke University
(and also graduated from Duke University School of Law), argues "players
should not be restricted[;] . . . they should be allowed to participate in [the]
college sports market openly and get their fair market value like every other
person is allowed to do[,] including every other student."32
This Article acknowledges that a college education itself possesses val-
ue. 33 Nevertheless, the value of that education does not erase the facts that
college athletics have become a multibillion-dollar industry and that univer-
sities have the ability to pay college athletes under a free market system if
the NCAA's compensation limit was removed.34 This Article provides a de-
tailed approach to compensating college athletes under a free market model.
The approach includes a salary cap, the terms necessary for standard play-
ers' contracts, and a determination of who can represent players.
Part II briefly discusses why the NCAA rules prohibiting compensation
violate antitrust law.35 Part III examines the free market approach in a de-
tailed manner, which includes, among other things, a discussion on salary
cap, the terms of a proposed standard player's contract, and a payment simu-
lation for football and basketball teams.36 Part IV addresses the counterar-
guments to the approach and responses thereto.37 This Article provides the
most detailed and in-depth description of how a free market model would
work while concluding that a free market system to compensate college ath-
letes is both appropriate under antitrust law and viable.38
31. See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism (last visit-
ed Nov. 9, 2018).
32. Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas, J.D., ESPN Analyst, Of Counsel, Moore & Van Allen
(July 24, 2015) [hereinafter "Bilas Interview"] (on file with author).
33. See Anemona Hartocollis, What Is a College Education Worth?, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2016)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/national/college-applications/what-isa-college-
education-worth (discussing the economic importance of a college education in the United States).
34. See Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, and the Student-Athlete, 34
CARDOzO L. REv. 107, 129 (2012) (describing the unjust enrichment the universities receive by us-
ing players' images and likeness without compensating them); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College
Sports, ATLANTIC, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/20 11/10/the-shame-of-college-
sports/308643/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/K9W8-LS2F] (alleging college athletes
contribute to the multibillion dollar industry of college sports, many without pay).
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part IV.
38. Compare Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 206, 208, 226-27, 235, 240, 255-61 (1990) (criticizing the NCAA's no-pay
model and exploring alternative models that could support compensation to college athletes, ulti-
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II. THE NCAA's PROHIBITION ON ATHLETES EARNING SALARIES
VIOLATES ANTITRUST LAW
A. The NCAA Forbids College Athletes from Profiting Based on the Sport
They Play
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), an unincorpo-
rated association comprised of individual member schools, regulates inter-
collegiate athletics in the United States.39 It includes over 1,200 member in-
stitutions across three divisions: Division I, Division II, and Division III40
Division I, in which member schools offer full scholarships to their athletes,
involves "the highest level of competition in most sports."1 Division II uti-
lizes a partial-scholarship model,4 2 and it competes at a lower-caliber level
than Division I.43 Division III, which does not include scholarships for its
athletes, serves as the lowest level of competition amongst the three divi-
sions.4 The NCAA further divides Division I football into the Football
Bowl Subdivision (FBS), formally known as Division I-A, which includes
the most competitive teams in Division I football, and the Football Champi-
onship Subdivision (FCS), previously known as Division I-AA, which in-
cludes lesser Division I football teams." Division I schools, including the
FBS,4 6 normally include schools with the largest student bodies, the most
robust athletic budgets, and the greatest number of athletic scholarships
awarded.
mately concluding a free market model would be most appropriate), with Joshua Lee & Jaimie
McFarlin, A European Solution to America's Basketball Problem: Reforming Amateur Basketball in
the United States, 6 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 95, 141-42, 144-46, 153, 155-56, 158 (2015) (pro-
posing a socio-cultural approach to the issue of amateur sports similar to the club system predomi-
nate in Europe but with a foundation in free market principles where college athletes are able to pur-
sue financial support based on their fair market value).
39. Walter T. Champion, Jr., Sports Law: Cases, Documents, and Materials 164 (2d ed. 2014).
40. Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, http://www.
ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-
classification (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6KLV-CN5S].
41. Matthew Mitten et al., Sports Law and Regulation 107 (4th ed. 2013).
42. NCAA, Division II Partial-Scholarship Model, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/division-
ii-partial-scholarship-model (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/78KE-JLQH].
43. MITTEN, supra note 41, at 107.
44. Id.
45. Divisional Differences and the History ofMultidivision Classification, supra note 40.
46. Gould, supra note 10, at 15-17.
47. NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=dl [https://perma.cc/B54G-
LK9L] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
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The NCAA sets forth and enforces the rules for its member schools and
athletes.8 Chief among those rules, particularly for purposes of this Article,
is the NCAA's rule that prohibits college athletes from earning pay in their
respective college sport.4 9 Namely, NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2 provides that a
college athlete becomes ineligible if the athlete "[u]ses his or her athletics
skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport." 0 The NCAA
rules also prohibit a college athlete from earning compensation for endorsing
commercial products. 1
College athletes in Division I athletics may receive a grant-in-aid schol-
arship, which covers tuition, room, books, and board.5 2 A grant-in-aid
scholarship fails to cover the full cost of attendance for an athlete, which
amounts to "between $2,000 and $5,000 per year more than" the grant-in-aid
scholarship.53 The full cost of attendance can "include[] a tuition fee, mis-
cellaneous personal expenses, transportation, loan origination fee and ad-
ministrative fees."54 Some college athletes qualify for Pell Grants, which
help provide an actual full scholarship, while others do not qualify.55
Recent legislation called "autonomy legislation" allows Division I
schools to pay athletes the costs athletes incur beyond grant-in-aid scholar-
ships with full cost of attendance scholarships.56 In any event, the NCAA
still prohibits college athletes from receiving compensation beyond the full
4. What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-
10I/what-ncaa (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
49. Amateurism, supra note 3 1.
50. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 10, § 12.1.2.
51. Id. § 12.5.2.1(a) (forbidding a college athlete from "[a]ccept[ing] any remuneration for or
permit[ing] the use of his or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the
sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind").
52. Id. § 15.02.5 ("A full grant-in-aid is financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, room and
board, books and other expenses related to attendance at the institution. . . .").
53. Eric Prisbell, What is Full Cost ofAttendance for NCAA Athletes?, USA TODAY (Aug. 17,
2014, 5:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/17/ncaa-full-cost-of-
attendance/14200387 [https://perma.cc/WH7W-RV22].
54. Id.
55. See Travis L. Packer, College Cost Reduction and Access Act: A Good Step, but Only a Step,
12 N.C. BANKING INST. 221, 225-27 (2008) (discussing the mechanics of Pell Grants); O'Bannon v.
NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 n.24 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the NCAA allows college athletes to
receive Pell Grants, even above their cost of attendance scholarship amounts, and noting that Pell
Grants are available to athletes and non-athletes alike).
56. See generally Jake New, Autonomy Faces First Test, INSIDER HIGHER ED (Jan. 14, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/14/power-five-members-flex-new-legislative-
muscles-ncaa-convention (discussing the history of autonomy legislation and the passage of new
policies that allow schools to pay cost of living expenses).
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cost of attendance.
B. Courts Apply Antitrust Law Via the Sherman Act o Major College
Athletics
The Sherman Act, passed by Congress in 1890, prevents monopolies
and seeks to preserve competition through free markets.8 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits any "contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States."5 9 As every contract
limits or restrains trade to a certain extent, "the Supreme Court has limited
the restrictions contained in section 1 to bar only 'unreasonable restraints of
trade."' 60
A plaintiff prevails on an antitrust violation claim under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act if he demonstrates "(1) . . . there was a contract, combination,
or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under
either a per se rule of illegality or a [R]ule of [R]eason analysis; and (3) that
the restraint affected interstate commerce."61
Rule of Reason analysis involves a burden-shifting test where the plain-
tiff must first demonstrate "that an agreement had a substantially adverse ef-
fect on competition."6 2 A plaintiff can show the "anticompetitive effect indi-
rectly by proving that the defendant possessed the requisite market power
within a defined market or directly by showing actual anticompetitive ef-
fects, such as control over output or price." 63 If the plaintiff satisfies that
burden, then the defendant must prove that the restraint on trade that creates
57. See generally Jon Solomon, The History Behind the Debate Over Paying NCAA Athletes,
ASPEN INSTITUTE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-
paying-ncaa-athletes/ (providing a comprehensive history of the debate over paying NCAA athletes).
58. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QX89-EPJ9]
(describing the goal of antitrust laws: "to protect the process of competition for the benefit of con-
sumers, making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices
down, and keep quality up").
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
60. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. 85, 98 (1984)).
61. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Bhan v. NME
Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991)).
62. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
63. Id.; see also Fortner Enter., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) (defining
"[m]arket power" as "the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output"); Agnew v.
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (defining "market power" as "the ability to raise prices
significantly without going out of business").
214
[Vol. 46: 203, 2019] The Blue Devil's In The Details
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the anticompetitive effect is based on an actual and legitimate procompeti-
tive justiication.64 Thus, the defendant carries the heavy burden of proving
that the "the challenged restraint enhances competition."65 Notably, "mere
profitability or cost savings have not qualified as a defense under the anti-
trust laws." 66 If the defendant's burden is satisfied, then the plaintiff "must
prove that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the
legitimate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substan-
tially less restrictive manner."67 If all of the burdens are met, then "the
harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in order to judge
whether the challenged behavior is . . . reasonable."68 In other words, "the
fact[-]finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable re-
straint on competition."69 The primary question under Rule of Reason anal-
ysis is whether "the restraint . . . clearly tends to harm competition (as, for
example, by raising prices to consumers or reducing output, product quality,
or innovation), or . . . [does the restraint] actually facilitate more effective
competition or at least leave competition unaffected?"70
64. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984). Legitimate procompetitive objectives
include "preventing free riding, lowering transaction costs, and facilitating other output-promoting
transactions." ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 988 (2d ed. 2008). Other examples of acceptable procompeti-
tive objectives involve "increasing output, creating operating efficiencies, enhancing product or ser-
vice quality, and widening consumer choice." RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (7th ed. 2011).
65. Bd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 104.
66. Law, 134 F.3d at 1023. Procompetitive justifications require actual evidence, while specula-
tive, unsubstantiated, or uncertain claims are generally deemed insufficient to refute evidence of an-
ticompetitive effects. Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Mod-
ern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 774-75 (2012) (analyzing the Rule of
Reason test).
67. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019; see United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993);
Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997); Hairstonv. Pac. 10 Conf., 101
F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996); Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1368 (3d Cir.
1996).
68. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019. Courts sometimes use the quick-look approach under the Rule of
Reason. Id. at 1020. The quick-look approach applies when the challenged restraint involves an
obvious anticompetitive effect, such as an agreement not to compete in terms of price (e.g., price-
fixing) or output. Id. If that is the case, then "the court is justified in proceeding directly to the
question of whether the procompetitive justifications advanced for the restraint outweigh the anti-
competitive effects under a 'quick look"' analysis. Id.
69. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
70. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW §§ 5:7; see, e.g.,
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879 (2007) (conducting a Rule of
Reason analysis).
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In the seminal case of Board of Regents," the United States Supreme
Court applied a Rule of Reason analysis to major college athletics, which
courts continue to do today.7 2 In that case, the Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association
sued the NCAA based on the NCAA's former restrictions in the 1980's re-
garding televising college football games.7 3 The NCAA's restrictions in-
cluded the following: (1) a limit on the total number of games that could be
televised; (2) a limit on the total number of each school's games that could
be televised; (3) a fixed price that the networks would pay for particular tel-
ecasts; and (4) a requirement that all contracts between television networks
and universities receive approval by the NCAA. 4 Under a Rule of Reason
analysis, the Supreme Court found for plaintiffs and struck down the
NCAA's rules on television restrictions as anticompetitive without any pro-
competitive justifications in violation of antitrust law. "
Despite finding an antitrust violation by the NCAA, the Supreme Court
demonstrated incredible deference to the NCAA in its ability to regulate and
oversee college athletics, stating that the NCAA must establish:
[R]ules on which the competitors agreed to create and define the
competition to be marketed. A myriad of rules affecting such mat-
ters as the size of the field, the number of players on a team, and the
extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed,
all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which insti-
tutions compete.76
The Supreme Court noted that college football is a product and repre-
sents a particular brand of football that includes an academic tradition where
"athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like." 77
The Supreme Court further argued, "[T]he NCAA plays a vital role in ena-
71. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
72. Bd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 86-135; see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 343 (7th Cir.
2012) (applying the Rule of Reason analysis); Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (applying the quick-look ap-
proach under the Rule of Reason analysis); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir.
1988) (applying the Rule of Reason); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig., 990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (applying the Rule of Reason).
73. Bd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 85.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 85-89.
76. Id. at 101.
77. Id. at 102.
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bling college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a
product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable."" Courts
continue to show a great deal of deference to the NCAA, and that extreme
deference to the NCAA played a role in the O 'Bannon7 9 case that limited the
amount of compensation athletes can earn."
C. O'Bannon Found an Antitrust Violation But Fell Short
The plaintiffs in O 'Bannon included current and former college football
players and Division I men's basketball players who sought damages from
the NCAA based on the licensing of their names, images, and likenesses
(NILs) in videogames, archived game footage, live game broadcasts, and
re-broadcasts.1 The district court held the NCAA's compensation rules vio-
lated antitrust law under the Sherman Act.8 2 The district court's two perma-
nent injunctions precluded the NCAA from preventing its member institu-
tions from providing full cost of attendance scholarships and from
compensating their athletes up to $5,000 based on shared revenue the ath-
letes could collect after graduation.8 3 The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the dis-
trict court's holding that the NCAA's rules violated antitrust law, upheld the
first permanent injunction allowing member institutions the ability to pro-
vide athletes full cost of attendance scholarships, but it vacated the second
permanent injunction allowing $5,000 for athletes in deferred compensation,
opining that the $5,000 compensation was "untethered to educational ex-
penses.""
Under the Rule of Reason, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit
found the plaintiffs demonstrated that the NCAA's prohibition on athletes
receiving compensation for the use of their NILs constituted a significant an-
78. Id.
79. O'Bannonv. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
80. Id, at 1050; see also Bd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 86 (giving deference to the NCAA); Agnew
v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 347-48 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the plain-
tiffs case because they failed to find "a relevant market for student-athlete labor"); Rock v. NCAA,
928 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1018-22 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (holding "[p]laintiff's proposed market is imper-
missibly narrow" and "not legally cognizable"); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz.
1983) (showing deference to the NCAA's rulemaking activity since "the NCAA's action does not
constitute an unreasonable restraint under the Sherman Act").
81. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff'd in part and vacated
in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 989.
84. O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078.
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ticompetitive effect on the relevant market." The courts identified the rele-
vant market as the college education market where "colleges compete for the
services of athletic recruits by offering them scholarships and various ameni-
ties, such as coaching and facilities."8 6 Sans the NCAA prohibition, contend
the courts, NCAA's member institutions would compete with each other by
paying the college athletes for NILs as a part of obtaining the services of
college athletes; instead, the prohibition allows member institutions to price-
fix the amount they will pay college athletes for their NILs, and they set that
amount at zero." Video game manufacturers would also negotiate and com-
pensate college athletes for the use of their NILs but for the NCAA's com-
pensation prohibition."8
The district court and the Ninth Circuit, however, relied on the concept
of amateurism to find a procompetitive justification for the restraint of trade
at issue, namely the NCAA's prohibition on compensation.8 9 The NCAA's
amateurism argument can be summed up succinctly: if universities pay col-
lege athletes, then they are not amateurs anymore, and less people will watch
because it will change and diminish the product.90 The NCAA relied on a
study it commissioned to try to show that consumers would watch less col-
lege athletics if the players received payment.91
The NCAA's study suffered from several fatal flaws. One, "the sur-
vey's initial question skewed the results by priming respondents to think
about illicit payments to student-athletes rather than the possibility of allow-
ing athletes to be paid."92 Two, the study looked at future behavior of con-
85. See id. at 1070-72; O 'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985-88.
86. O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070.
87. Id. at 1072.
88. Id. at 1067.
89. The courts also examined the NCAA's three other purported procompetitive justifications:
(1) integrating athletics and education, (2) maintaining competitive equity, and (3) increasing output.
See id. at 1058-60; O 'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999-1007. The courts accepted the first of those
remaining three justifications, but the district court determined that the compensation rules "play a
limited role in integrating student-athletes with t eir schools' academic communities," and the Ninth
Circuit did not dispute that finding. O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072. The district court rejected the
other two purported justifications, and the Ninth Circuit did not disturb those findings either. See
O 'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001-02.
90. See O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054-55 (discussing the history of the NCAA's amateurism rules
and enforcement).
91. See Testimony of Defendants' Expert Witness, John Dennis, at 2603-05, O Bannon, 7 F.
Supp. 3d 955 (No. 4:09-cv-03329-CW), 2014 WL 6862783 [hereinafter "Dennis Testimony"]
(showing Dr. John Dennis' survey results on how the paying of college athletes supposedly affects
demand, particularly in "viewing and attending college football games and basketball games").
92. O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.
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sumers, an area that is rife with speculation and potential inaccuracy as simi-
lar studies demonstrated.93 Dr. Daniel Rascher, an expert who testified on
behalf of the plaintiffs, discussed two previous consumer demand surveys
regarding the anticipated skyrocketing of professional baseball players' sala-
ries in the 1970s and the eventual allowance of professional athletes compet-
ing in the Olympics.94 In both surveys, consumers indicated they would
watch less once major league baseball player salaries increased and profes-
sionals competed in the Olympics, respectively, but consumers actually
watched more major league baseball after player salaries rose, and viewer-
ship of the Olympics also increased when professionals competed in the
Olympics.95 The faulty NCAA study also found that the more a college ath-
lete might be paid, the less members of the general public or self-identified
sports fans would approve paying college athletes.96
The district court found the study unpersuasive and attacked the
NCAA's defense of amateurism.97 According to the district court, "the
NCAA has revised its rules governing student-athlete compensation numer-
ous times over the years, sometimes in significant and contradictory ways." 98
The district court also stated the NCAA's "current rules demonstrate that,
even today, the NCAA does not consistently adhere to a single definition of
amateurism."99 Nevertheless, the court somehow conceded that "some re-
93. Id. at 976-77 (noting the plaintiffs' evidence that showed the "limits of opinion surveys as
predictors of consumer demand," such as examples of past consumer surveys that were inaccurate).
94. Id. at 977.
95. See id. at 1081 (Thomas, C.., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the pur-
ported correlation of viewership to the payment of athletes).
96. See Dennis Testimony, supra note 91, at 2651-54. For example, the following are the disap-
proval rates based on the stated compensation amount each player would receive: (1) $20,000 pay-
ment: 38% disapproval for members of the generalpublic and 36% disapproval forfans; (2) $50,000
payment: 47% for members of the general public and 52%forfans; and (3) $200,000 payment: 53%
for members of the general public and 62% for fans. Id.
97. O 'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999-1005.
98. Id. at 1000.
99. Id. The district court explained:
A Division I tennis recruit can preserve his amateur status even if he accepts ten thousand
dollars in prize money the year before he enrolls in college. A Division I track and field
recruit, however, would forfeit his athletic eligibility if he did the same. Similarly, an
FBS football player may maintain his amateur status if he accepts a Pell [G]rant that
brings his total financial aid package above the cost of attendance. But the same football
player would no longer be an amateur if he were to decline the Pell [G]rant and, instead,
receive an equivalent sum of money from his school for the use of his name, image, and
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strictions on compensation may still serve a limited procompetitive purpose
if they are necessary to maintain the popularity of FBS football and Division
I basketball[,]" finding, however, that there were less restrictive means to
achieve this procompetitive justification. 100
The Ninth Circuit also accepted the amateurism argument as a procom-
petitive justification stating that "the amateur nature of collegiate sports in-
creases their appeal to consumers"101 and "not paying student-athletes is
precisely what makes them amateurs."102 The Ninth Circuit relied heavily
on dicta from the Supreme Court decision in Board ofRegents, arguing that
amateurism allows the "market for college football" to remain "distinct from
other sports markets and must be 'differentiate[d]' from professional sports
lest it become 'minor league [football]."'
10 3
Finally, the courts looked at less restrictive alternatives than the
NCAA's prohibition on compensating college athletes above their grant-in-
aid scholarship amounts for their NILs.104 The district court found two: "(1)
allowing NCAA member schools to give student-athletes grants-in-aid that
cover the full cost of attendance; and (2) allowing member schools to pay
student-athletes small amounts of deferred cash compensation for use of
their NILs."10 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's first alternative
but disaffirned the second alternative because compensation above the full
cost of attendance was, according to the court, "untethered" to educational
expenses.106 Thus, the Ninth Circuit placed athletes in their own group re-
garding compensation, as no other group in college athletics, including
coaches, administrators, and executives, adheres to a requirement that its
compensation is tethered to an educational component.10 The Jenkins case,
which is discussed in the next section, seeks compensation in a free market
model for college athletes, just as it exists for everyone else in major college
100. Id. (acknowledging that '"maximiz[ing] consumer demand for the product' is a legitimate
procompetitive justification" (quoting NCAAv. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984))).
101. O'Bannonv. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015).
102. Id. at 1076.
103. Id. at 1076-77.
104. See id. at 1074-79 (considering the "substantially less restrictive alternatives" the district
court identified in its Rule of Reason analysis).
105. Id. at 1074.
106. Id. at 1076.
107. See id. at 1078-79 (noting that the court was "afford[ing] the NCAA 'ample latitude' to su-
perintend college athletics" (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120
(1984))).
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athletics. o0
D. The NCAA's Prohibition on Athlete Compensation Violates Antitrust
Law as Jenkins Currently Seeks
The Jenkins case, which has been stayed in the Northern District of Cal-
ifornia, seeks a free market approach for compensating college athletes.10 9
The Jenkins complaint sets forth the analysis showing how the NCAA's
prohibition on athlete compensation violates antitrust law using the Rule of
Reason.110 In Jenkins, several college football and men's basketball players
brought suit against the NCAA and the Power Five Conferences in a pur-
ported class action.' The named plaintiffs include "three top-tier college
football and men's basketball players," and the class includes all similarly
situated college athletes.112
In accord with the Rule of Reason analysis, the Jenkins complaint first
sets out to identify the unreasonable restraint of trade that produces signifi-
cant anticompetitive effects. 1 13 In particular, the complaint alleges that de-
fendants "entered into what amounts to cartel agreements with the avowed
purpose and effect of placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid
108. See infra Section II.D for a discussion on the Jenkins case that has been stayed in the North-
ern District of California. For a detailed look at how the free market system could work in major
college sports, see infra Part III.
109. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1367 (J.P.M.L.
2014) (transferring the case from the District of New Jersey to the Northern District of California by
a multidistrict litigation panel because of the other antitrust cases against the NCAA that were al-
ready pending in the Northern District of California); see also Marc Edelman, The District Court
Decision in O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for Col-
lege-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23 19, 2363-
64 (2014) (advocating for a free market system to compensate college athletes); Lee Goldman,
Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 208
(1990); Andy Schwarz & Dan Rascher, Opposing View: College Sports Should Work as Free Mar-
ket, USA TODAY (Jan. 12, 2012, 11:33 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story
/2012-01-12/college-football-free-market/52524448/1 [https://perma.cc/Y4PA-Y9R3] (opining that
a free market model would increase graduation rates, improve academic performance, ultimately
"provide competitive balance among those schools that care the most").
110. Second Amended Complaint-Class Action Seeking Injunction at 28, Jenkins v. NCAA, No.
4:14-cv-02758-CW, 2015 WL 732448 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2015).
111. Id. at 1. The Power Five Conferences are the five major competitive conferences in college
football today. See, e.g., ESPN Staff, Power 5 Conference Power Rankings, ESPN (Sept. 4, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/ /id/24570980/power-5-conference-power-rankings
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to these athletes for their services."" The defendants set the ceiling on
compensation at the grant-in-aid level, or the full cost of attendance, which
is horizontal price fixing by the NCAA and its member institutions, consti-
tuting a significant anticompetitive effect.1
The complaint identifies the relevant market as the "market for
... [FBS] football player services" and the "market for NCAA Division I
men's basketball player services."116 But for the NCAA's limit on athlete
compensation, "FBS and D-J men's basketball programs would clearly com-
pete economically with one another for player services.""' The complaint
states that a free market with competition for the services of college athletes
would "provide fair compensation to these athletes for the billions of dollars
in revenue that they help generate.""
The purported procompetitive benefit of amateurism fails to provide an
actual, substantive justification for the anticompetitive effect on the mar-
ket.119 The defendants possess no reliable evidence that if college athletes
are paid, then less people will watch college football and basketball
games.120 Chris Plonsky, the former Athletic Director for Women's Athlet-
ics at the University of Texas in Austin, testifying on behalf of the NCAA in
the O'Bannon trial, put it best when she conceded, "I would venture to say
that if we [UT] offered a tiddlywinks team, that would somehow be popular
with some segment of whoever loves our university." 121 College football
fans and men's college basketball fans exhibit an unyielding passion for
their teams rooted in geography (someone who grew up and lives in Kansas
will likely always be a Kansas Jayhawks basketball fan) and family tradi-
tions (e.g., some families include generations of graduates from Notre Dame
114. Id.
115. Id. at 28.
116. Id. at 13.
117. Id. at 19.
118. Id.
119. Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable nor Necessary: Amateurism
in Big-Time College Sports, 14 ANTITRUST 51, 55 (2000) (stating that "[c]ollege sports need not
include amateurism to prosper," and that national on-field and on-court competition could "thrive in
a system of conference-level wage regimes").
120. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff'd in part and vacated
in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that "the NCAA restrictions on student-athlete com-
pensation play a limited role in driving consumer demand for FBS football and Division I basket-
ball-related products," and that the NCAA did not "present sufficient evidence to show that its re-
strictions on student-athlete compensation actually have any effect on competitive balance").
121. See Testimony of Defendants' Expert Witness, Christine Plonsky at 1414-15, O 'Bannon, 7
F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:09-cv-03329-CW), 2014 WL 6907626.
222
[Vol. 46: 203, 2019] The Blue Devil's In The Details
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
who will always cheer on the Fighting Irish football team) that will not be
affected by college athletes receiving equitable compensation for their con-
tributions.122 In fact, these alumni and boosters might willingly open up
their checkbooks to cover the costs to secure the services of the premier ath-
letes who might bring championships and glory to their respective teams.123
Furthermore, the general public might be more interested in watching col-
lege games if the product improves, which certainly could happen if, for ex-
ample, the top college basketball players tay in school longer than one year
because they sign a two or three-year deal with their university.124
The NCAA's and the Power Five conferences' other supposed procom-
petitive benefits, such as integrating athletics and education, maintaining
competitive equity, and increasing output should ultimately fail just as they
did in O'Bannon.125 Because the defendants cannot satisfy their burden of
demonstrating an actual procompetitive justification for the limit on college
athlete compensation, the NCAA's cap violates antitrust law. 126 Therefore, a
free market approach could be employed by the universities to compensate
college athletes.127 The details of such an approach follow in the next sec-
tion.
III. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF A FREE MARKET APPROACH IN MAJOR
COLLEGE SPORTS
This section describes how the free market approach would apply in col-
lege football and men's college basketball. It addresses several key ingredi-
122. See O 'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1002 (finding that the "popularity of college sports is driven
primarily by factors such as school loyalty and geography").
123. See Brad Wolverton & Sandhya Kambhampati, Colleges Raised $1.2 Billion in Donations
for Sports in 2015, CHRONICLE (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Raised-
12-Billion/235058 (demonstrating the volume of capital that is donated to college athletic programs).
124. Patrick Hruby, The Free Market Case Against the NCAA Chokehold on College Sports,
WASH. TINES (Mar. 30, 2012), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/30/the-free-
market-case-against-the-ncaa-chokehold-on/ (arguing that s udent athletes would have a "far greater
incentive than they do now to stay at, play for, and graduate from their schools" if colleges paid
them).
125. See O'Bannonv. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015) (accepting the district court's
findings that the NCAA's compensation rules "do not promote competitive balance, . . . do not in-
crease output in the college education market, and . . . play a limited role in integrating student-
athletes with their schools' academic communities").
126. See id. at 1070 (explaining the three-step framework of the Rule of Reason that must be used
to analyze the NCAA's compensation rules in light of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
127. See id.
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ents necessary for a successful free market system in college athletics, in-
cluding the following: a hard salary cap; terms in a proposed standard play-
er's contract; and a determination of who can represent college athletes.
Before addressing these issues, a brief discussion of labor law is war-
ranted to understand how a free market approach could be accomplished as
college athletes would be paid like employees-because they are employees.
A. College Athletes Are Employees
As stated supra, the Ninth Circuit conceded in O 'Bannon that college
athletes provide the labor which is essential to creating the NCAA's product,
i.e., the games that consumers attend and watch.128 Similarly, a now-
rescinded non-binding memorandum written by the former General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Richard Griffin, Jr. ("Grif-
fin"), analyzed whether Division I FBS football players are employees under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and determined that they are.129
The memorandum remains relevant to this discussion because it provides
sound analysis and there is always a possibility that, if a new administration
takes over, it might re-adopt Griffin's viewpoint or the current administra-
tion might change its course on this topic at some point. 130
The former General Counsel Griffin first analyzed the exemptions in the
NLRA under Section 2(3) for employees and noted that they omit football
players, which "is itself strong evidence of statutory coverage."131 Griffin
then concluded that football players are employees under the common law
definition of employee, which "includes any person 'who perform[s] ser-
vices for another and [is] subject to the other's control or right of control.
128. 802 F.3d at 1066.
129. Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Nat'l Labor & Relations Bd., General Counsel's Report on the Statu-
tory Rights of University Faculty and Students in the Unfair Labor Practice Context, 1-2 (2017),
https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4582342bfc [https://perma.cc/N99B-RM36] [here-
inafter General Counsel's Report]; Joseph Wilkinson, New NLRB General Counsel Rescinds Memo
That Labelled Football Players As Employees, Daily Nw. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://dailynorthwestem
.com/2017/12/15/lateststories/new-nlrb-general-counsel-rescinds-memo-labelled-football-players-
employees/ (reporting that the "[n]ew general counsel Peter Robb, who was appointed by President
Donald Trump and confirmed by the U.S. Senate on Nov. 8, [2017] invalidated that [Griffin] memo
on Dec 1[, 2017]").
130. See GENERAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 129, at 18-21 (analyzing whether FBS foot-
ball players are employees and concluding that hey are).
131. Id. at 18 (citing Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York, 364 NLRB No. 90, slip
op. at 5 (Aug. 23, 2016)).
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Consideration, i.e., payment, is strongly indicative of employee status.'
13 2
The former General Counsel determined that college football players at
Northwestern University, who brought the original complaint seeking to un-
ionize, provided services to Northwestern University by "generat[ing] ap-
proximately $76 Million in net profit during the ten year period ending in
2012-2013[] and provid[ing] an immeasurable positive impact to Northwest-
ern's reputation, which in turn undoubtedly boosted student applications and
alumni financial donations."133 Football players received compensation in
return for their services in the form of scholarships.134 Moreover, Griffin
concluded that universities and colleges "control the manner and means of
scholarship football players' work on the field and numerous facets of the
players' daily lives to ensure compliance with NCAA rules[,]" 135 and they
also "regulat[e] players' hourly tasks from the time they wake up until the
appointed hour that they go to sleep and require[e] full-time hours during
training camp and the regular season and the equivalent of a part-time job of
between 12-25 hours during the off-season."13 6
Thus, Griffin reasoned, if Division I FBS football players at private uni-
versities brought a complaint, then the NLRB would treat them as employ-
ees and afford them with the protections of Section 7 of the NLRA, regard-
less of whether they choose to "form or support a union." 137 Section 7
provides employees with the "right to engage in concerted activities for 'mu-
tual aid or protection.'
13 8
As employees, college athletes could utilize the College Athlete Players'
Association (CAPA), which helped file the Northwestern case before the
NLRB, to negotiate standardized terms for the player's form contract, which
is discussed below.139 CAPA, comprised of over 17,000 Division I college
athletes, is a national group that advocates for college athletes' rights.140
132. GENERAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 129, at 18 (citing Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. & House
Officers' Ass'n Comm. of Interns and Residents, 330 NLRB No. 30, slip op. at 160 (Nov. 26,
1999)).
133. GENERAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 129, at 19.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 19.
136. Id. at 20.
137. Id. at 21.
138. Id. at 21; see also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (discussing the rights of employees to self-
organization and to collective bargaining).
139. See infra Section III.C (analyzing a possible standard player's contract for college athletes).
140. Who We Are, C. ATHLETES PLAYERS Ass'N, http://www.collegeathletespa.org/about (last
visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9RMC-4JDP].
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Each athlete could then obtain personal representation to negotiate the spe-
cifics of his contract, such as salary, bonuses, and length of contract-
individual representation is also discussed below.1'
B. Hard Salary Cap
The National Football League (NFL) and National Basketball Assica-
tion (NBA) employ two different types of salary caps: a hard cap and a soft
cap, respectively.14 2 The NFL uses the hard cap, which "sets a specific limit
on the amount a team may pay its players, and teams may not exceed this
amount under any circumstances."1 4 3 The NBA, on the other hand, utilizes
the soft cap, which "sets a maximum amount, like the NFL cap, but allows
its teams to exceed the cap in specific situations.""' For instance, the veter-
an player exception to the NBA salary cap "allows a team to re-sign its own
free agent for any amount, provided the player played with the team for at
least three years."" Another exception enables "a team to sign one or more
players, even if the team is over the cap, to contracts totaling one million
dollars per year.146
Salary caps clearly represent restraints on trade as they limit the amount
players or employees can earn."' Thus, under antitrust analysis, salary caps
require some procompetitive justification to persist." Competitive balance
between the teams serves as the primary procompetitive justification for sal-
141. See infra Section III.E (discussing who can represent college athletes to negotiate their con-
tracts with universities).
142. Alan M. Levine, Note, Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for
the Professional Sports League, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 243, 245 (1995)
(specifying the salary cap structures applied by the NBA and NFL).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 245-46.
145. Id. at 278-79.
146. Id. at 279. There are other exceptions to the NBA salary cap as well, such as: (1) the non-
taxpayer mid-level salary exception; (2) the minimum salary exception; and (3) the early qualifying
veteran free agent exception. See Christopher R. Deubert et al., Comparing Health-Related Policies
and Practice in Sports: The NFL and Other Professional Leagues, 8 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 169 (2017) (enumerating various exceptions to the NBA salary cap).
147. See Levine, supra note 142, at 248 (arguing the salary cap's purpose is to restrain players'
salary); see also Scott J. Foraker, Note, The National Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Anti-
trust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 157, 171 (1985) (noting there is evidence to suggest a salary cap
restrains trade).
148. Foraker, supra note 147, at 176 (stating the salary cap restrains trade and must therefore be
examined to determine whether the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive justifica-
tions).
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ary caps.14 9 Salary caps allow for the even distribution of talent across teams
that helps make the games between teams more competitive, which in turn
creates a better product on the field or court for consumers.15 0 If teams could
pay players any amount of money they wanted, then the teams with the most
money would offer the best players more money, likely resulting in the best
players going to the richest teams."1 As a result, the games might be less
competitive, reducing consumer demand, if certain teams had all the best
players and competed against teams with lesser players.15 2
Similarly, if college teams could pay their athletes any amount they
wanted, then the schools with the richest donors would pay exorbitant
amounts to obtain the services of the best players in the country. Boosters of
the University of Alabama, which boasts one of the most successful football
teams in the country, paid off its head coach's $3.1 million mansion to entice
the coach to stay at Alabama.15 3 If no salary cap existed in college athletics,
there is no telling how much rabid boosters and alumni would pay to attract
149. Id. ("Proffered justifications for the salary cap are that it increases the financial stability of
league franchises and that it fosters a competitive balance among franchises.").
150. See Sean W.L. Alford, Dusting Off the AK-47: An Examination ofNFL Players'Most Pow-
erful Weapon in an Antitrust LawsuitAgainst the NFL, 88 N.C. L. REv. 212, 260 (2009) ("The salary
cap limits teams' ability to hoard talent via overcompensation . . . ."); see also Timothy J. Bucher,
Note, London Bridges Falling Down: How Conflicts Between U.S. and European Law May Derail
the NBA's Move to Europe, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.. 377, 412 (2012) (acknowledging the salary
cap contributes to the distribution of players amongst eams); Ryan M. Rodenberg & Justin M.
Lovich, Reverse Collusion, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 191, 221 (2013) (arguing the distribution
of talent and competitiveness are results of the salary cap).
151. Levine, supra note 142, at 288 ("Without [salary] restrictions, proponents of the salary cap
argue, the resulting salary disparities would allow large market teams to outbid small market teams
for the best players[.]"); see also Why Certain MLB Teams Can Afford Star Players and Others
Cannot, Nw. Bus. REv. (Jan. 3, 2012), https://northwestembusinessreview.org/why-certain-mlb-
teams-can-afford-star-players-and-others-cannot-bb5d9fca0524 (discussing the MLB's lack of a sal-
ary cap and the "clear gap" between the MLB's richest teams and poorest teams that results).
152. Jeremy Venook, The NBA's Latest Attempt to Promote Competition: $200-Million Contracts,
ATLANTIC (May 17, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/nba-super-max-
contract/526935/ [https://perma.cc/5B89-ETT3] ("[The salary cap and its penalties] prevent[] situa-
tions like that currently happening in professional baseball, in which cash-rich teams like the Los
Angeles Dodgers and New York Yankees often spend several times as much money on players as
smaller-market teams .... ); see also Michael Schottey, How the NFL Became the Most Competi-
tive League in All of Sports, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 20, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1574285-how-the-nfl-became-the-most-competitive-league-in-all-of-sports [https://perma.cc/DDK9-
4YDS] (depicting the effect of the salary cap on competition and implying that without the salary
cap it is likely that enterprising owners would "jump at one of the top free agents every year").




[Vol. 46: 203, 2019] The Blue Devil's In The Details
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the top quarterback or running back to play for their schools. A salary cap in
college athletics would help maintain competitive balance while still allow-
ing athletes to cam compensation." Employing a salary cap, which the
NFL and NBA use, serves as a less restrictive means to maintain a competi-
tive balance than completely prohibiting college athlete compensation."'
Moreover, if college players were considered employees, then the uni-
versities and the NCAA might seek some type of an exemption to avoid anti-
trust scrutiny of the salary cap altogether.15 6 For example, the universities
and the NCAA might ask Congress to grant a limited antitrust exemption to
allow the salary caps, or, if CAPA or some other entity negotiated a collec-
tive bargaining agreement on behalf of the players with the universities, the
universities and the NCAA might seek a non-statutory labor exemption to
shield a salary cap from antitrust scrutiny, just as the NFL and the NBA
do.157
In any event, the simplicity of a hard cap appears more attractive than
multiple exceptions like the NBA utilizes.151 After the free market system
has existed in college athletics for several years, exceptions to the hard cap
may be appropriate or necessary.159 Until that time and need, a simple hard
154. See Stefan Kesenne, The Impact ofSalary Caps in Professional Team Sports, 47 SCOTTISH J.
POL. ECON. 422, 429 (2000) (finding that "[a] salary cap improves the competitive balance in a
league").
155. See Steve Murphy & Jonathan Pace, A Plan for Compensating Student-Athletes, BRIGHAM
YOUNG U. EDU. L. J. 167, 178-80 (1994), https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1065&context=elj. Revenues include all revenue streams, including "ticket sales, revenue
from luxury box suites and premium seating, local and national broadcasting (TV/radio/Intemet)
royalties, concessions, parking, local advertising, stadium leasing, and merchandising," and in the
NFL, the salary cap is based on a percentage of the total revenues generated by the teams. See Al
Lackner, NFL Salary Cap FAQ, ASKTHECOMMISH, http://www.askthecommish.com/SalaryCap
/Faq.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/26LH-VA5U]. The NBA's salary cap is de-
termined in a similar fashion (according to its collective bargaining agreement between the league
and the NBA Players Association) by using the "basketball-related" income generated by the league
and its team, including, among other things, "gate receipts, ... [b]roadcast rights[,] ... program and
concession sales[,] . . . [p]arking[, and] [p]roceeds from team sponsorships [and] . . . team promo-
tions." Larry Coon, NBA Salary Cap FAQ, CBAFAQ (July 1, 2018), http://www.cbafaq.com/salary
cap.htm#Q12 [https://perma.cc/2HC5-DFSJ].
156. See Thomas R. Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, Payment ofStudent-Athletes: Legal & Practical
Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 81 (2000).
157. See id. at 65.
158. Levine, supra note 142, at 278-79 (discussing the specific exceptions to the soft salary cap of
the NBA).
159. See id. (discussing the exceptions to the salary cap in the NBA, which could serve as an ex-
ample for future exceptions in college athletics).
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cap will be the easiest o employ. 160 Even in professional football, the num-
ber of available players-fifty-three (53) on the active roster and ten (10) on
the practice squad-and the desire for a competitive league enable a hard
cap to thrive.161 FBS teams typically include eighty-five (85) scholarship
athletes, which is more than enough to account for injuries.162 In college
basketball, when players leave for the professional ranks or suffer injuries,
teams can add walk-ons to fill open spots.16 3 Thus, the recruitment of walk-
ons will continue to be important in college basketball under a hard salary
cap because, if three or four players under contract suffer injuries, then spots
open up for playing time that year although money may not be available for
those filling those spots on the roster. 164
1. Football Salary Cap: $3 Million
This Article proposes a hard salary cap of $3 million for several reasons.
Most importantly, this number represents a figure that many schools who
generate millions of dollars of revenue could easily afford to pay. 165 If Col-
leges and universities reallocated the hefty revenues generated by their
teams or the salaries paid to their coaches and athletic administrators, then
they could afford to pay players $3 million per year.166 For example, Jim
Harbaugh, head coach of the University of Michigan's football team, re-
ceived a salary alone of over $7 million in 2017, and several of his assistants
160. See id.
161. Jeanna Thomas, Here's How NFL Practice Squads Work, SB NATION (Aug. 31, 2018, 9:47
AM), https://www.sbnation.com/2016/9/3/12773904/nfl-practice-squad-players-roster-rules-
eligibility-primer [https://perma.cc/8P53-5BYU].
162. Alex Kirshner, The difference between FBS and FCS football, explained quickly, SB NATION
(Aug. 25, 2018, 7:54 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2017/11/19/16647542/ncaa-
fbs-fcs-differences-ia-iaa-scholarships-division-1-what-is ("FBS teams re allowed 85 [scholar-
ships,] ... while FCS teams allow 63 or fewer scholarships.").
163. See Charlie Zegers, What Is a Walk-On?, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.
thoughtco.com/what-does-walk-on-mean-325796 (explaining that a walk-on is "an athlete who be-
comes part of a team without being ... awarded an athletic scholarship").
164. See id.; see also Michael Felder, Examining the Process ofBeing a College Football Walk-
On, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/1591099-examining-
the-process-of-being-a-college-football-walk-on (explaining that recruited walk-ons make up the rest
of the team in addition to the scholarship athletes in college sports).
165. Joe Nocera, A Way to Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TiES (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/sports/a-way-to-start-paying-college-athletes.html [https://
perma.cc/Q6V7-R5DZ] (proposing a $3 million salary cap because universities could afford it).
166. See id.
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now make $1 million each. 167 Even football programs that are traditionally
not as successful as others spend millions of dollars on coaches' salaries,
such as the University of Kentucky, which paid its football coaches over $6
million in 2016.168 Moreover, some athletic directors make seven figures,
some of which could be reallocated to pay the players.169
Also, college football playoff system revenues could cover the compen-
sation expense of players. Conferences receive revenues from the college
football playoff system based on how many of their teams reach the college
football playoffs semifinals, how many of their teams play in the
non-playoff bowl games-known as the New Year's Six games-that are
part of the of the college football playoff system, and how many of their
teams meet the NCAA's APR for participation in a post-season football
game. 70 The conferences then distribute the revenues to the teams pursuant
to "each conference's own rules." 7' In total, the revenues for each confer-
ence for the 2016-2017 season included: Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC),
$88.5 million; Big 10, $132.5 million; Big 12, $95 million; Pac-12, $101
million; and Southeastern Conference (SEC), $101 million.172 The number
of teams vary by conference, with fifteen being the most (in the ACC) and
ten being the least (in the now improperly named Big 12).173 Thus, it would
take $45 million (fifteen teams multiplied by the $3 million salary cap for
each team) to compensate all of the football teams in the ACC. Therefore,
the revenues from the college football playoff system alone, $88.5 million
167. 2017 NC4AF Coaches' Salaries, supra note 13; 2017 NC4AF Assistant Coaches' Salaries,
supra note 13.
168. See 2017 NC4AF Coaches' Salaries, supra note 13. Further, reallocation would be simple as
coaching salaries only represent "a fraction of the expenses" that university athletic departments
spend. Michael Aiello, Compensating the Student-Athlete, 23 SPORTS L.J. 157, 165 (2016).
169. See Athletic Director Salary Database, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
college/201 3/03/06/athletic-director-salary-database-methodology/1968783/ (last visited Sept. 25,
2018) [https://perma.cc/W8MW-U94Q] (reporting the highest athletic director salary goes to David
William from Vanderbilt, whose salary totals $3,239,678, and indicating eight more athletic direc-
tors each receive compensation over $1 million).
170. See College Football Playoff Revenue Distribution Policies, COLL. FOOTBALL PLAYOFF,
http://www.collegefootballplayoff.com/revenue-distribution (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma
.cc/GR24-YT8L] (detailing how revenue from college football playoffs are distributed); see also
Kristi Dosh, College Football Playoff Payouts by Conference for 2016-17, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2016,
2:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristidosh/2016/12/3 1/college-football-playoff-payouts-by-
conference-for-20 16- 17/#4ebe8d4f572d (recounting the payout for playoffs by each conference).
171. Dosh, supra note 170.
172. Id.
173. See Power 5 Conference Power Rankings, ESPN (Sept. 4, 2018), http://www.espn.com/col
lege-football/story/ /id/245 70980/power-5-conference-power-rankings.
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for the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) (for example), would easily com-
pensate its athletes with tens of millions of dollars left over for distribution
according to each conference's rules. The ACC would have $43.5 million
remaining after compensating its athletes, and the Big 10 (which has four-
teen teams) would have $90.5 million remaining.
Universities and athletic departments could also spend much less on fa-
cilities to attract players and simply pay the players. Kansas State finished
its new football facility in 2015, which cost $68,000,000.174 Rice Universi-
ty, which does not reside in a Power Five Conference, invested over
$30,000,000 to construct a new sports facility.17 5 Boosters and alumni who
contribute to these projects could use those donations to pay the athletes in-
stead.
Also, even if universities did not reallocate the millions of dollars they
make to give some to players, then boosters and alumni could certainly cov-
er that cost. Given that boosters paid off Nick Saban's $3.1 million man-
sion,17 6 it appears that this number falls within the range that schools via
boosters and alumni could afford to pay.
The $3 million hard salary cap also allows college athletes who generate
millions of dollars for their schools to earn compensation for creating the
product on the field and court without earning an exorbitant amount that the
NCAA would argue might offend the average consumer."' This theory as-
sumes that teams would use its $3 million cap space to distribute the com-
pensation amongst many of its players, as opposed to paying, for example,
three players $1 million each. This would allow a team such as Rice Uni-
versity (hereinafter "Rice"), though, to pay fewer players and spend less than
the $3 million, but Rice could outbid a Power Five Conference school like
Ohio State for one or two of Ohio State's 4 star recruits, which would make
Rice a more competitive team.
174. See K-State Football Announces Plans for Next Bill Snyder Family Stadium Project, TOPEKA
CAP.-J. (Sept. 9, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://cjonline.com/sports/catzone/2015-09-09/k-state-football-
announces-plans-next-bill-snyder-family-stadium-project [https://perma.cc/5S89-E9V7] (providing
that "K-State had the grand opening of the $68 million ... [c]omplex last week[] and the next phase
of the stadium improvements has a $15 million price tag").
175. See Rice Holds Ceremonial Groundbreaking for New Brian Patterson Sports Performance
Center, RICE OWLS (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.riceowls.com/genrel/031015aab.html [https://perma
.cc/B9RV-3DTH].
176. Scarborough, supra note 153.
177. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015). In O Bannon, the NCAA's ex-
pert argued that "Americans 'generally oppose[] the idea of paying college football and basketball
players,"' particularly if the amounts paid reached $200,000 per player. Id.
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2. Men's College Basketball Salary Cap: $500,000
The salary cap for men's college basketball should be lower than the
college football cap because men's college basketball only generates a frac-
tion of the revenues that football does." For example, one of the highest
revenue producing football programs is the University of Texas, which gen-
erated $127.5 million during the 2015-16 fiscal year.17 9 One of the highest
revenue producing men's college basketball programs is the University of
Louisville, which generated $ 45.6 million during the 2015-16 fiscal year.so
Overall, college football programs consistently generate much more revenue
than men's college basketball programs.' The much lower salary cap in
basketball than football also stems from the fact that football programs in-
clude eighty-five (85) scholarship athletes while basketball programs only
include thirteen (13) scholarship athletes.18 2
The rationale for the salary cap discussed in the preceding section for
college football also applies to the $500,000 salary cap for basketball, name-
ly universities could afford it and the players' salaries would likely not of-
fend the average consumer. For example, John Calipari, the head coach of
the University of Kentucky's men's basketball team, received a salary in
178. See David Jones, Which Are the 25 Richest College Football Programs? A Few Names Near
the Top Might Surprise You, PENN LIVE (May 8, 2017), http://www.pennlive.com/pennstatefootball
/index.ssf/2017/05/richestcollege footballprogr.html; Which College Basketball Programs Make
the Most Money? Syracuse Among Top 5, SYRACUSE (Mar. 30, 2017),
http://www.syracuse.com/orangebasketball/index.ssf/2017/03/which college basketballprograms
make themostmoneysyracuseamong top_5.html.
179. See Jones, supra note 178 (ranking the 25 richest football programs for the 2015-16 fiscal
year "based on gross revenue figures obtained from the U.S. Department of Education," which were
in turn "obtained from the schools' mandatory gender-equity filings" reflecting the 2015 football
season); see also Michael Wayne Bratton, Five of the Top 10 Richest College Football Programs
Are from the SEC, SATURDAY DOWN SOUTH, https://www.saturdaydownsouth.com/sec-
football/five-top-10-richest-college-football-programs-sec/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2018) [https://perma
.cc/DWA9-7J66] (reporting Texas was ranked as the number one college football program with the
highest revenue for the 2015 football season "with a revenue of $127.5 million").
180. Which College Basketball Programs Make the Most Money? Syracuse Among Top 5, supra
note 178 (listing the college basketball programs with the highest revenue and naming Louisville as
the program with the highest revenue for the 2015-16 basketball season).
181. Compare Jones, supra note 178 (reporting the top 25 college football programs made be-
tween $50 million and $127.5 million individually during the 2015-16 fiscal year), with Which Col-
lege Basketball Programs Make the Most Money? Syracuse Among Top 5, supra note 178 (noting
the top 20 college basketball programs made between $14.4 million and no higher than $45.6 million
individually during the 2015-16 fiscal year).
182. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 15.5.5, 15.5.6.1 (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.ncaapublic
ations.com/productdownloads/D117.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB2W-57FN] (restricting football teams
to eighty-five total scholarships and basketball teams to thirteen).
232
[Vol. 46: 203, 2019] The Blue Devil's In The Details
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
2016-2017 of over $7 million, 18 3 some of which would easily cover the en-
tire $500,000 needed to compensate his players. Additionally, or alterna-
tively, revenues generated from success in the men's NCAA basketball tour-
nament could be used to compensate players."' The ACC in 2016, for
instance, reportedly received nearly $40,000,000, and only $7.5 million (fif-
teen teams multiplied by the $500,000 salary cap for each team) would be
needed to compensate the players; the ACC could then distribute the remain-
ing $32.5 million to its teams.8 5 Furthermore, boosters and alumni dona-
tions could cover the costs of compensating players.18 6 Prior to paying any
college athlete, both the universities and the players would want a standard
player's contract that sets out the rights and responsibilities of both parties.
The next section discusses and provides a proposed standard player's con-
tract.
C. Standard Player 's Contract
The NFL and NBA use a standard player's contract to set forth the
rights and responsibilities of the teams and the players,S? while college ath-
letics utilize the National Letter of Intent, the Athletic Aid Agreement, and
NCAA rules to cover the obligations of the parties when a university pro-
vides a scholarship to an athlete.' Under a free market system, colleges
183. 2017 NC4AB Tournament Coaches'Pay, supra note 13.
184. See Malcolm Lemmons, College Athletes Getting Paid? Here Are Some Pro and Cons,
HUFF. POST (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/college-athletes-
getting-paid-here-are-some-pros-consus_58cfceeoe4bo7112b6472f9a (indicating that athletes
should receive revenue from what they help to produce).
185. See Darren Rovell, ACC on Track to Shatter Record for Money Earned in NCAA Tourna-
ment, ESPN (Mar. 26, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/ /id/15071018
/atlantic-coast-conference-set-shatter-record-money-eamed-ncaa-men-basketball-toumament
[https://perma.cc/E7E8-QJCV].
186. See Scarborough, supra note 153.
187. See NFL Player Contract, SB NATION, http://assets.sbnation.com/assets/744265/APPENDIX
Aplayer contract .pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/BST4-ZYRQ] (providing an
example of an NFL standard players' contract); NBA, National Basketball Association Uniform
Player Contract A-1, TECH PROGNOSIS, http://blog.techprognosis.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/
05/NBAConstitution.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9KAQ-372V] (providing an
example of an NBA Basketball Contract).
188. See Sample Athletic Financial Aid Agreement Letter, ATHNET, http://www.athleticscholar
ships.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/0 1/Example-Athletic-Aid-Agreement.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2018) [https://perma.cc/5T65-AGU4]; National Letter ofIntent, ATHNET, http://www.athleticscholar
ships.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/National-Letter-of-Intent-Example.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2018) [https://perma.cc/3874-QNTY] (providing an example of a national letter of intent).
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and athletes should utilize a standard player's contract. As stated previously,
CAPA could negotiate the terms of a standard player's contract on behalf of
college athletes.18 9 Attached as Appendix A is an exemplar of what that
contract should include, and the following text discusses the key terms for
each party. 190
Before discussing those essential terms for each side, it must be under-
stood generally that these college athlete contracts will be based primarily on
how the athlete performs in high school and how he is projected to perform
in college.191 Athletes in football and men's basketball receive rankings
from nationally recognized organizations, such as Rivals, that assess the tal-
ent of high school prospects and project how successful those prospects will
be in college. 192 "Five stars" are highly coveted prospects and would likely
seek higher salaries than two-star rated players or players who do not earn
any stars in the ranking.193 The optional bonus sections built into the stand-
ard contract allow for flexibility in negotiating the contract to enable lower
base salaries and incentive laden contracts.194
1. Essential Terms for Universities and Colleges
The university or college would seek a number of provisions. As an ini-
tial matter, the university would require that the athlete meet the admission
189. See Hurst, supra note 156.
190. See infra Appendix A.
191. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., 2017 Top Football Recruits, 247 SPORTS, http://247sports.com/Season/2017-
Football/RecruitRankings?InstitutionGroup=highschool ( ast updated Nov. 22, 2017, 1:20 PM)
(ranking 2017's top recruits); Jeff Nusser, Rivals, Scouts, ESPN, 247: Star Rating System Explained,
SB NATION (Jan. 31, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.cougcenter.com/wsu-football-recruiting/2013/
2/5/3956800/rivals-scout-espn-247-star-rating-system-national-signing-day [https://perma.cc/CG9S-
AQDA] (explaining the star rating system is a "quick [...] way for recruiting services [such as, Ri-
vals, Scouts, ESPN, and 247,] to convey the talent level of a specific recruit, ranging from two stars
to five stars"); see also About Us, RIVALS (Jan. 8, 2016), https://n.rivals.com/news/about-us
[https://perma.cc/T22G-X45Q] (crediting itself as having "revolutionized college football and bas-
ketball recruiting coverage" by providing, among other things, "national player rankings, online vid-
eo highlights, player cards and searchable player database, [and] official visit lists").
193. Nusser, supra note 192 ("It's not hard to figure out that more stars are better[.]"); see also
C.W. O'Brien, College Football Recruiting for Beginners Part I: How Are Players Ranked?,
BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 29, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/117345-recruiting-for-beginners-
part-i-how-are-players-ranked [https://perma.cc/6FRB-WECD] (noting a five star in Rivals recruit-
ing services means the player is a "[g]reat prospect. Game ready as a true freshman. Prospect has
the ability to be a difference-maker immediately").
194. See infra Appendix A.
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requirements of the university,195 maintain academic eligibility, 19 6 and ad-
here to all academic and conduct policies of the university, conference, and
NCAA to protect the academic integrity of the school and to uphold the rep-
utation of the university.197 The university would also require that the ath-
lete attend all mandatory practices, workouts, meetings, and games.198 The
university, to protect its substantial investment in each player, would prohib-
it the athlete from engaging in physical activities that are either outside of
playing the sport for the university or involve a significant risk of injury un-
less the university consented in writing beforehand. 199
The university would also seek a covenant not to compete to prevent the
player from leaving during the term of the contract for a more lucrative con-
tract at another university or in the professional ranks.20 0 This provision
could be softened to allow a player to leave early for the NBA or NFL if the
player was drafted.20 1 In any event, the university would want to retain the
current NCAA rule that prevents players from leaving if a coach, such as the
head coach who recruited that player, leaves the university.20 2
2. Essential Terms for Athletes
The athletes would want a number of basic protections in their contract
as well. Athletes would seek multi-year contracts, compensation for any in-
juries that arise based on playing for the university, and independent verifi-
cation of their grades to avoid being removed from the team for
non-academic or athletic performance issues.20 3 Athletes might also seek
bonuses based on individual athletic performance, team performance, and
academic performance.204
3. Essential Terms for Both Parties
The athlete would want a provision that provides injury will not result in
195. See Sample Athletic Financial Aid Agreement Letter, supra note 188.
196. See id.
197. See Bilas Interview, supra note 32.
198. NFL Player Contract, supra note 187.
199. Id.
200. See Bilas Interview, supra note 32.
201. Id.
202. National Letter ofIntent, supra note 188.
203. See Bilas Interview, supra note 32.
204. See id.
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the loss of salary for that school year, but the university would not be re-
quired to pay the player's salary for the remaining years on the contract if he
was unable to play.20 5 Moreover, the athlete would want a provision that
stated he could not lose his scholarship based on injury during the term of
the contract.20 6 These provisions protect the academic integrity of the rela-
tionship between athlete and university by allowing the athlete to keep his
scholarship if injured.20 7 These provisions also allow the university to re-
structure contracts for the next year with the additional money no longer
subject to the cap that could be used on players who had outstanding years
and deserve more compensation or on the incoming class for the next year,
or both.20 8
Critically, the contract would include a provision allowing the university
(and the NCAA) to use the athlete's NIL to promote, advertise, and broad-
cast games, but the NCAA could not use the athletes' NIL to endorse any
third-party products.20 9 The athlete, on the other hand, could profit on his
NIL by endorsing third-party products, such as video games, food and bev-
erages, clothing, cars, and any other product that aligns with the mission and
values of the university and the NCAA. 210 Numerous legal scholars advo-
205. See, e.g., NFL Player Contract, supra note 187 (providing an example of such a provision:
"Unless this contract specifically provides otherwise, if Player is injured in the performance of his
services under this contract and promptly reports such injury to the Club physician or trainer, then
Player will receive such medical and hospital care during the term of this contract as the Club physi-
cian may deem necessary, and will continue to receive his yearly salary for so long, during the sea-
son of injury only and for no subsequent period covered by this contract, as Player is physically una-
ble to perform the services required of him by this contract because of such injury.").
206. See id.
207. See John S. Elson, Academic Integrity and/or Winning Football? The Moral Dilemma ofAc-
ademically Elite Colleges with Division I Football Teams and the Special Case of Northwestern,
HUFF. POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-s-elson/academic-integrity-andor-b7308056.html
(last updated May 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2V5C-475K] (suggesting that colleges must strike a
balance between the competing interests of student athletes and coaches, especially when players are
injured).
208. See Bilas Interview, supra note 32 (discussing that athletes and schools tend to plan contract
terms with the future in mind).
209. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187.
210. See Gabe Feldman, The NCAA and "Non-Game Related" Student-Athlete Name, Image and
Likeness Restrictions, KNIGHT COMM'N INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (2016), https://www.knight
commission.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/feldmannilwhitepaper may_20 16.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/5DXJ-A3pE] (proposing an endorsement framework that would allow the "NCAA [to] con-
tinue to ensure that all forms of commercial activity undertaken as part of college athletics (includ-
ing broadcast and institutional sponsorship deals), are conducted in a manner consistent with the
NCAA's educational mission and other core goals").
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cate for college athletes to profit from their NILs, 211 and the general popula-
tion would likely not oppose such endorsement deals.212 Professor Gabe
Feldman, the Director of the Tulane Sports Law Program and the Associate
Provost for NCAA Compliance, presented a procedure for athletes to en-
dorse commercial products to the Knight Commission, which seeks to pro-
tect and serve college athletes while maintaining the academic missions of
the universities.213
If not only college football and men's basketball players could profit
from their NILs, but also all other college athletes, such as baseball players,
women's basketball players, swimmers, and so on, then all college athletes
could earn profits based on the sport they play, which might help minimize
any animosity, if it even existed, or equity issues with the non-revenue gen-
erating sports.214 In a free market system, allowing college athletes to profit
on their NILs might create more public interest in non-revenue generating
college sports.215 For instance, if a swimmer like gold-medalist Katie Le-
decky endorsed a major company, like McDonald' s or Gatorade, when she
was swimnuing at Stanford University, and she became more popular and
recognizable, then the public's interest in seeing her compete in collegiate
swim meets would have likely increased.216
211. See, e.g., Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, and the Student-Athlete,
34 CARDOzO L. REV. 107, 129 (2012); Alex Moyer, Note, Throwing Out the Playbook: Replacing
the NCAA's Anticompetitive Amateurism Regime with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
761, 775 (2015).
212. See Will Hobson & Emily Guskin, Poll: Majority ofBlack Americans Favor Paying College
Athletes; 6 in 10 Whites Disagree, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
sports/colleges/poll-majority-of-black-americans-favor-paying-college-athletes-6-in- 10-whites-
disagree/2017/09/14/27fa5fc2-98df-11e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html [https://perma.cc/FD2J-73S
M] (showing a shift of support for the payment of college athletes).
213. See Feldman, supra note 210.
214. See id. at 3 (stating: "The basic case for allowing non-game related NIL payments is straight-
forward. As a general matter, free markets lead to the optimal economic outcome and interference
with free competition leads to an inefficient allocation of resources and a variety of potential eco-
nomic harms. The harm to student-athletes from collusion in the market for non-game NIL pay-
ments is obvious. Student-athletes (like all people) have a property right in their name, image, and
likeness ('NIL'). Many student-athletes have created tremendous value in their NILs and, absent
NCAA restrictions, would receive significant compensation for them in an open market.").
215. See id.
216. See Mwendwa M. Zipporah & Hellen K. Mberia, The Effects of Celebrity Endorsement in
Advertisements, 3 INT'L J. ACAD. RES. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 178 (2014), http://hrmars.com/
hrmarsjiapers/TheEffects_OFCelebrity EndorsementinAdvertisements.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5BWH-8MW7] (discussing the relationship between celebrity endorsements and increased public
popularity).
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Under a free market system, the teams could choose any combination of
compensation, including base salaries, signing bonuses, athletic bonuses,
and academic bonuses.217 The compensation for each player would vary
based on how much the market dictated each player should be paid.218 The
simulations below demonstrate how Ohio State could compensate its foot-
ball team and how Rice University could become more competitive in a free
market system.
D. Free Market Simulations
1. Football
The following simulation includes the full 2017-2018 roster for Ohio
State, and it details the players' salaries and bonuses under the proposed sal-
ary cap of $3 million. 219 The complete simulations, which include the play-
ers' names, class year (i.e., Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior, with a
Redshirt [RS] designation as well, meaning the player sat out a year, or red-
shirted, because of health or the coaches' decision), positions, and compen-
sation, can be found in Appendix B at the end of this Article. 220 The simula-
tions make a number of assumptions. One, athletes who are more highly
rated by traditional ranking services, such as Rivals, would likely earn high-
er base salaries than lower-rated players coming out of high school. This
makes sense given that college athletes would typically enter into these con-
tracts before they started in college. Two, the base salaries might be similar,
then, for players with the same ranking coming out of high school. This
could change, obviously, given the need of a team at certain positions or
whether a team values certain positions more than others, such as a quarter-
back over a linebacker. The model below, however, provides a more uni-
form approach to determining base salaries a team could accept or easily
modify as it pleases. Three, the simulation assumes that the players on
scholarship are the athletes with a star-rating.
217. See Feldman, supra note 210.
218. See Dave Barri, How About a Free Market for College Athletes?, FREAKANOMICS (Mar. 22,
2013, 9:36 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2013/03/22/how-about-a-free-market-for-college-athletes/
[https://perma.cc/HUE3-SEQH] (mentioning the control that a free market would give to colleges).
219. See San Francisco 49ers 2018 Salary Cap, SPORTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/san-
francisco-49ers/cap/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/R6KX-ZFPM] (showing salary
cap for San Francisco 49ers).
220. See infra Appendix B.
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In addition to the base salaries, the ypothetical contract for each player
in the Ohio State simulation includes a bonus of $1,000 ($85,000 total for
the 85 scholarship players) for reaching a college football playoff system
bowl game, which this simulation assumes the team did. 22 1 The contract in
this scenario also includes a bonus for earning a spot on the All-American
team (either first, second, or third team), which includes $1,500 for First
Team All-American honors, $1,000 for Second Team, and $500 for Third
Team.22 2 In the simulation, two players earn first team honors (Billy Price
and Denzel Ward) and one player earns second team honors (Nick Bosa),
and those players' performance bonuses are marked with an asterisk.223 Fi-
nally, each freshman player ranked as a 5-Star recruit by Rivals receives a
signing bonus of $1,000 under the simulation, and there are six such players
on this team.2 24
This free market model does not include a minimum player salary like
the NBA and NFL employ.2 25 The primary reason for this is to prevent
schools from being forced out of participating in college football or men's
college basketball because they claim they cannot afford to pay players.226
Without a minimum, schools can decide how much, if any, they want to
compensate players.227 A player such as the author would have gladly cho-
sen to play Division I football at Rice on full scholarship without a salary or
bonus rather than not play Division I football at Rice (or at all).228 In other
words, Rice and other teams outside of the Power Five Conferences will still
be able to procure players, likely including many of the exact same ones
they do under the current system.2 29
221. See infra Appendix B.
222. See infra Appendix B; see also Ralph D. Russo, 2017AP All-America Teams, USA TODAY
(Dec. 11, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2017/12/11/2017-ap-all-
america-teams/108511150/ [https://perma.cc/2PA6-93U6] (listing the 2017 All-American teams).
223. See infra Appendix B.
224. See infra Appendix B.
225. See Michael Ginnitti, NFL Minimum Salaries for 2017, SPORTRAC (JAN. 28, 2017),
http://www.spotrac.com/blog/nfl-minimum-salaries-for-2017/ [https://perma.cc/YJR2-VM9A] (de-
scribing NFL minimum salaries); What's the Minimum NBA Salary?, HOOPSHYPE (Oct. 12, 2015),
http://hoopshype.com/2015/10/12/whats-the-minimum-nba-salary/ [https://perma.cc/65PP-LVVZ]
(recounting the minimum salary for NBA players).
226. See Ginnitti, supra note 225; HOOPSHYPE, supra note 225.
227. See, e.g., infra Appendix B.
228. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[V]ery few athletes talented
enough to play FBS football or Division I basketball opt not to attend an FBS/Division I school ...
229. See generally Rice Owls Football, SCOUT FANTASY SPORTS, https://fftoolbox.scoutfantasy
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Under this simulation, Rice could pay its players the same base salary as
the Ohio State players based on the star ratings-i.e., $30,000 for 3-Star re-
cruits and $20,000 for 2-Star recruits (and one player without a star rating
$10,000).230 In addition, Rice might be able to steal three Ohio State play-
ers, J.K. Dobbins, Kendall Sheffield, and Demetrius Knox, each of whom
received 4-Star ratings. 23 1 Under the Ohio State simulation, those same three
players would receive $36,000 a year each, while under the Rice simulation
they would receive $60,000 a year each, which might sway them to stay in
their home state of Texas to play for the Fighting Owls in the city of Hou-
ston while being able to provide some more money to their families and
themselves than if they chose to play for Ohio State.2 32 Rice does not have a
4-Star recruit on its actual roster, but under a free market model, Rice could
possibly procure the services of several 4-Star players or even a 5-Star play-
er, which would make Rice more competitive in college football.233 Under
the current system, Rice has not obtained a 4-Star player, and without better
players, Rice will continue to be less competitive than if it acquired better
players.234 Under the simulation, however, which includes paying those
three athletes who are Texas natives and 4-Star players, and who would oth-
erwise be Ohio State-bound, $60,000 each, Rice's total compensation paid to
athletes would only be $1,890,000, which is over $1 million less than the
salary cap and Ohio State's payment of $3 million in compensation to its
players.235 By acquiring these better players, Rice would become more
competitive than they are under the current system. 2 36 If Ohio State knew
Rice was offering those 4-Star players a higher salary, then Ohio State might
offer more salary or potential bonuses to those 4-Star players and pay certain
3-Star players less, resulting in a competition for the services of those 4-Star
players.237 The players would need to weigh their options and priorities,
sports.com/nfldraft/profiles byteam.cfm?school=Rice (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc
/65PP-LVVZ] (displaying Rice Owls players and draft prospects).
230. See infra Appendix B.
231. See infra Appendix B.
232. See infra Appendix B.
233. See Rice 2018 Football Commits, 247 SPORTS, https://247sports.com/college/rice/Season
/2018-Football/Commits/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A5GF-RTBF] (showing Rice
University's 2018 recmiting class without any 4-star recmits).
234. See id.
235. See Appendix B.
236. Compare infra Appendix B (with 4-Star recmits), with Rice 2018 Football Commits, supra
note 233 (without 4-Star recmits).
237. See infra Appendix B.
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such as the following: how important it is to them to play in a Power Five
Conference with more national television exposure; the quality of coaching
in both programs; the academic prestige of the universities; how each col-
lege prepares its players for life after college football; how much compensa-
tion each university is offering; and how important it is to the athlete to stay
close to home.238 The universities would adjust their offers and compensa-
tion packages to the players to attract athletes to represent their universi-
ties. 239 That competition between universities to procure the services of ath-
letes describes precisely how a free market should and would work. Even if
one accepted the NCAA's flawed survey in O'Bannon regarding consumer
demand decreasing as the level of compensation increases for college ath-
letes, a $3 million salary cap reduces the possibility that most players will
earn over $100,000 total.24 0
In fact, under the simulation, the highest paid player from Ohio State
earns $47,000, and the highest paid player in the Rice simulation earns
$60,000.241 Most players on Ohio State earn in the low $40,000 range or
less, which would be considered a lower class income.24 2 The Pew Research
Center defines middle class income as between $46,960 and $140,900.243
An average consumer should not be offended when college athletes who
play on nationally televised games, appear in commercials promoting the
games and on SportsCenter highlights, and generate millions of dollars for
their respective universities, earn a lower-class income.24 4 Thus, consumer
demand would likely not be affected.24 5
238. See Choosing a College, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/choosing-
college (last visited Oct. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A5GF-RTBF].
239. See id.; see also infra Appendix B.
240. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015). In the NCAA's survey,
which included three amounts, $20,000, $50,000, and $200,000, members of the general public and
self-identified sports fans increased their disapproval of athlete payment as the compensation levels
increased. Id.
241. See infra Appendix B.
242. See infra Appendix B.
243. Tami Luhby & Tiffany Baker, What is Middle Class, Anyway?, CNN,
http://money.cnn.com/infographic/economy/what-is-middle-class-anyway (last visited Oct. 8, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/498H-UHRC].
244. But see O 'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1077 (describing sports fans' increased disapproval of athlete
payment as the compensation levels increased).
245. Consumer demand is currently soaring for college football. See Adam Kilgore, It's Two
Different Games': Why College Football Is More Fun Than the NFL, CHICAGO TRIB. (Sept. 21,
2017, 9:04 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-college-football-vs-nfl-20170921
-story.html. [https://perma.cc/BKD7-KMQQ]. Games are broadcasted on every day of the week
during the fall season. FBS (I-A) Schedule-2018, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/college-
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The simulations in this article are but two of thousands of possibilities
that each team could use to compensate their players under the $3 million
salary cap. For example, quarterbacks, regardless of their star-recruit rank-
ing, might be paid more because they are so valuable to a team's success,
while a kicker, punter, or long snapper might be paid less because they may
only play on special teams.24 6 Thus, in another simulation, all of the quar-
terbacks on the Ohio State roster-such as Ohio State's former standout
quarterback J.T. Barrett-could earn $5,000 or $10,000 more, and the kick-
ers, punter, and long snapper on Ohio State could earn $5,000 or $10,000
less.247 In reality, the compensation will depend on the market and the play-
er.24 8 Teams might also choose a wider range of salaries to pay its players,
such as $50,000 or $60,000 for its top players and $15,000 or $20,000 for its
least valuable players. Teams also might choose to pay certain bonuses,
such as statistical team leaders or academic bonuses, as opposed to the bo-
nuses chosen in the simulation. The beauty of a free market allows teams
and players, as well as the market itself, to dictate the terms of the deal.
Critics of a free market model might argue that if players receive differ-
ent compensation, or some receive no compensation at all while others do,
then resentment and jealousy could derail team chemistry and the cohesive-
ness of the team. This argument misses the mark because it demonstrates a
fundamental misunderstanding of athletes. Athletes view sports as a meri-
tocracy.24 9 An athlete earns what he or she deserves because performance
determines who receives the accolades and praise.250 The best players re-
ceive more awards, interviews, and media attention than the lesser players.251
Jay Bilas agrees.25 2 "It's patently absurd that there would be fights in the
locker room if the best player made more money than the last player on the
football/schedule (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/56GL-PYF4]. ESPN even broadcasts
several spring practice games, which are intra-squad games. Id. Live attendance of fans at spring
games is also high. Austin Ward, Ohio State Breaks Own Record for Attendance in Spring Game,
ESPN (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/ /id/15217254/ohio-state-
breaks-own-record-attendance-spring-game [https://perma.cc/PF85-6PUH].
246. See Bucky Brooks, Ranking Each Position 's Importance, from Quarterback to Returner,
NFL (July 27, 2015, 10:34 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000503855/article/ranking-
each-positions-importance-from-quarterback-to-returner [https://perma.cc/KG7W-MA3G].
247. Cf infra Appendix B (describing a different simulation).
248. See infra Appendix B (displaying the possibility of different compensations for different
players based on their rankings).
249. See MITTEN, supra note 10, at 7 (discussing sports as a meritocracy).
250. Bilas Interview, supra note 32.
2 5 1. Id.
252. Id.
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team or [when] [sic] the quarterback makes more than the person who snaps
him the football, just as there are[n't] fights in the locker room among
coaches when the head coach makes more money than the assistants."25 3
College athletes, who already receive a disparate amount of attention, would
likely understand when more successful and coveted teammates earn com-
pensation greater than less successful and less coveted teammates.
2. Basketball
The following is a simulation of the University of Kentucky's men's
basketball team under the proposed $500,000 salary cap.254 It includes a
number of the same assumptions as the football simulation, including that
higher ranked players will receive higher salaries.255 This hypothetical also
includes contracts for each player with performance bonuses that include
$1,000 for each player if the teams wins a conference tournament champion-
ship, $2,000 for each player based on a Sweet Sixteen appearance in the
NCAA tournament, and $4,000 each for reaching the Final Four.25 6 This
hypothetical assumes those goals were reached.257 This simulation also in-
cludes a $3,000 signing bonus for 5-Star recruits, payable upon matricula-
tion into the school.258 The total compensation would equal $496,000,
which could be paid through a reallocation of resources, including the
coaches' compensation or NCAA Tournament revenues, or willing and ea-
ger alumni and boosters could cover that expense.259
253. Id.
254. See infra note 260 and accompanying chart.
255. See infra note 260 and accompanying chart.
256. See infra note 260 and accompanying chart.
257. See infra note 260 and accompanying chart.
258. See infra note 260 and accompanying chart.
259. See infra note 260 and accompanying chart.
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2017-2018 UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY MEN'S BASKETBALL TEAM 26 0
Player Posi- Year Base Sign- Per- Ri- Cap
tion Sal- ing for- vals Hit
ary Bo- mance Rank
nus Bonus ing
Hamid Guard RS 35, 7,000 5 $42,
ou Di- FR 000 Stars 000
allo
Wenye Guard SO 35, 7,000 5 $42,
n Ga- 000 Stars 000
briel
Quade Guard FR 35, 3,000 7,000 5 $45,
Green 000 Stars 000
Sacha For- SO 35, 7,000 5 $42,
Killey ward 000 Stars 000
a-
Jones
Kevin For- FR 35, 3,000 7,000 5 $45,
Knox ward 000 Stars 000
Nick For- FR 35, 3,000 7,000 5 $45,
Rich- ward 000 Stars 000
ards
Jarred For- FR 35, 3,000 7,000 5 $45,
Van- ward 000 Stars 000
derbilt
PJ For- FR 35, 3,000 7,000 5 $45,
Wash- ward 000 Stars 000
ington
260. 2017-18 Men's Basketball Roster, UK ATHLETICS, http://ukathletics.com/roster.aspx?path
-mbball (last visited Oct. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5GYQ-622L]; see Cats Illustrated, RIVALS,
https://kentucky.rivals.com/content/basketball ( ast visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Y7LZ-
JMDP] (listing the star rankings for the Kentucky basketball team).
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Je- Guard FR 30, 7,000 4 $37,
maral 000 Stars 000
Baker
Shai Guard FR 30, 7,000 4 $37,




Tai For- RS 30, 7,000 4 $37,
Wynya ward SO 000 Stars 000
rd
Jonny Guard JR 10, 7,000 N/A $17,
David 000 000
Dillon Guard RS 10, 7,000 N/A $17,
Pul- JR 000 000
liam
Totals 390, 15, 91,000 $496,
000 000 000
As with football, a team like Rice could offer a 5-Star recruit $70,000 a
year and its other athletes $20,000 a year (for six players) and $10,000 a
year for its other players (six players), and the total compensation would on-
ly be $250,000, which is half of the salary cap. A 5-Star recruit would likely
make Rice much more competitive in college basketball than it is now.2 61
Another payment simulation might include an escalating yearly base salary,
particularly for basketball players, to further entice them to stay in college
and forgo entering the professional draft. 262  The types of bonuses and
amounts offered in each simulation could change, and each base salary need
not be uniform based on the recruiting ranking.2 63 What each contract con-
261. See Nusser, supra note 193, and accompanying text (explaining the rating system and
demonstrating the value of a 5-Star player).
262. Cf supra note 260 and accompanying chart; see also Associated Press, Draft Decisions to
Have Huge Impact on 2018-19 Hoops Season, USA TODAY (May 31, 2018, 12:24 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2018/05/30/draft-decisions-to-have-huge-impact-on-
2018-19-hoops-season/35517325/ [https://perma.cc/CV7Y-UBLK] (discussing the major impact of
losing college basketball players to the draft).
263. Cf supra note 260 and accompanying chart.
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tains for each player would depend on what the team agrees to based upon
what the agent for the player seeks and successfully obtains. The representa-
tion for the players is discussed in the following section.
E. Determining Who Can Represent College Athletes
College athletes would need representation to negotiate their contracts
with universities. The simplest way to ensure competent representation of
college athletes would be to require the agent was certified by the NFL or
NBA or the agent was a lawyer. Provided that the NFL or NBA could sanc-
tion an agent for conduct during the representation of a college athlete, then
the entities and rules that govern the NFL, NBA, and lawyers would ensure
proper agent conduct.264 For example, the NBA and NFL maintain rules for
agents that represent players in their respective leagues, and each state bar
regulates attorney conduct through its rules of professional conduct.265 The
professional leagues and a lawyer's state bar can sanction an agent for con-
duct in violation of the applicable rules, and sanctions could include the rev-
ocation of one's certification or license, which serves as a powerful deter-
rence to improper agent conduct.266
Professional agents and lawyers should represent college athletes at an
extremely reduced rate or on a pro bono basis to gain access to these players
who might turn professional.2 67 Although one percent of college football
264. See generally Tamara L. Barner, Show Me the ... Ethics?: The Implications of the Model
Rules ofEthics on Attorneys in the Sports Industry, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 519, 520 (2003) (con-
sidering "whether it is necessary to apply the additional requirements of the [Model Rules] to the
attorneys operating in [the sports representation field]"); Walter T. Champion, Jr., Attorneys QUA
Sports Agents: An Ethical Conundrum, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 349 (1997) (addressing the gaps in the
regulation of sports agents); Chris J. Evanoff, Show Me the Money: How the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Can Deter NCAA Rules Violations Involving Sports Agents & College Ath-
letes, 8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2011) (discussing how the rules of profes-
sional conduct apply to sports agents); Scott Kestenbaum, Uniform Alternative Dispute Resolution:
The Answer to Preventing Unscrupulous Agent Activity, 14 PEPP. DiSp. RESOL. L.J. 55 (2014) (re-
garding the regulation of agents in professional sports); J. Houston Smith, III, Comment, In the
Sports Representation Industry: The Best Things Come to Those Lawyers Who Follow the Model
Rules, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 305 (2004) (examining how the ABA Model Rules affect the representa-
tion of athletes).
265. See Kestenbaum, supra note 254, at 66.
266. See, e.g., NBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents, NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS AsS'N
(June 1991), https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw Institute/
League0 o2Orules,%/o2Oregulations/Agent%/`2ORegulations%/`20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP94-XJA
B].
267. See John Infante, NCAA 's Legal Counsel Rules More Expansive Than You Think, ATHNET,
https://www.athleticscholarships.net/2013/07/09/ncaas-legal-counsel-rules-more-expansive-than-
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and men's college basketball players are drafted in their respective sports
leagues,2 68 an agent who could represent one or more of the elite athletes in
college would gain the inside track to representing them in the NFL or NBA,
where the compensation for agents is significant.269 Moreover, college play-
ers' agents should receive only a small percentage of the signing bonus,
which means that agents representing college football and basketball players
who do not receive signing bonuses, which may be most agents, will not re-
ceive any compensation.27 0 Again, the payoff for these agents would come
if and when they represent these players in their professional contracts, if the
players reached the professional ranks.271
Universities, the NCAA, and CAPA (on behalf of college athletes)
might agree to a limitation on agent contact for high school athletes.27 2 For
you-think.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZW64-9VN6]. Athletes, in addition to
the possibility of paying agents to represent hem, may also need to pay taxes given that their salaries
and bonuses would be income. Ryan Prete, Paying NCAA Student Athletes: Are Potential Tax Bur-
dens Worth It?, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.bna.com/paying-ncaa-student-
n57982089474/ [https://perma.cc/93ND-DTTM]. Universities, which provide a number of programs
to assist athletes already (such as study hall tutors and academic advisors), could utilize CPAs, law-
yers, or programs like VITA that assist low-income taxpayers, to help athletes complete and file
their taxes for free. See IRS VITA Grant Program, IRS (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/indi
viduals/irs-vita-grant-program [https://perma.cc/3AJB-DC5P]; Academic Support Services, UNIV. S.
CAL., http://saas.usc.edu/academic-support-services/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.
cc/H2AF-346D] (providing "academic counseling services[,] ... [p]riority [s]cheduling[,] [s]tudy
[h]all[,] [t]utorial [s]ervices[,] [c]omputer [l]abs[,] [t]ravel [l]aptops[,] [e]xcused [a]bsence [l]etters[,]
OASIS . . . [Online Academic Student Information System,] and [d]isability [t]esting" for its college
athletes to make sure "they have a successful and delightful college career while engaging in their
competitive sports"). College athletes would prefer to receive compensation that is taxed rather than
no compensation at all. See Prete, supra note 267.
268. Probability of Competing Beyond High School, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/re
sources/research/probability-competing-beyond-high-school (last visited Oct. 8, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/L5HJ-VRSA].
269. See Show Me the Money: So... You Want To Be A Sports Agent?, SPORTS MGMT. DEGREE
HuB, http://www.sportsmanagementdegreehub.com/sports-agent/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/T9ZU-3QB8] (stating sport agents' average commissions and salaries).
270. See Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Ethical and Statutory Limitations on Athlete Agent Income:
Fees, Referrals, and Ownership Interest, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 787, 811-21 (2000) (breaking down
general sport agent rules and regulations in each state, including limits on agents' portion of a bo-
nus).
271. See James Malone & Daren Lipinsky, The Game Behind the Games: Unscrupulous Agents in
College Athletics & California's Miller-Ayala Act, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 413, 413 (1997) (
"[T]he more talented the clients, the more money they will be worth, and the more money the agent
will earn . .. The competition for the client who will be the next Shaquille O'Neal or Reggie White
is fierce[.]").
272. See Michael McCann, What's Really to Come From the NCAA's Student-Athlete Agent An-
nouncement?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/
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example, an agent might be prohibited from signing a representation agree-
ment with a high school athlete until the athlete's senior year, but the agent
could start talking with potential clients as early as spring of the athlete's
junior year.27 3 In any event, the stakeholders would need to negotiate on the
particulars of the regulation of these agents.274 The next section addresses
the advantages of a free market model for compensating college athletes.
F Advantages of a Free Market Model
Numerous advantages for college athletes exist if they received compen-
sation above their scholarships for playing. One, the product, particularly
basketball games, will likely improve, as players who might have left early
stay in school because of the two or three-year deals they sign with their
universities.27 5 Two, players can help provide for their families' needs, es-
pecially if their families are socioeconomically disadvantaged.27 6 Three,
players may stay in school longer and either graduate or get closer to gradu-
ating if they sign multi-year deals.277 Four, players might work harder aca-
demically to ensure they stay eligible because they understand they are
providing necessary funds for their families. 27 8 Finally, athletes will be
treated equitably and like everyone else involved in the multibillion-dollar
business of major college athletics because they will be able to earn com-
pensation in a free market.27 9
A free market system might also yield benefits for the universities and
the NCAA. 28 0 For example, if players stay in school longer, resulting in bet-
ter teams and better rivalries (as players are playing against each other every
year for several years), then more people may watch, resulting in higher rat-
08/08/ncaa-agents-student-athlete-one-and-done-nba-draft [https://perma.cc/2BMJ-6QS5].
273. See Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of Basketball Corrup-
tion Scandal, N.Y. TIvMS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/sports/ncaa-
basketball-agents.html [https://perma.cc/4UDX-DL7H] (establishing rules regarding the contact be-
tween agents and young recruits).
274. See generally id.
275. Bilas Interview, supra note 32.
276. Id.
277. O'Bannonv. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015).
278. See Brendan Duggan, The Multifaceted Debate of Whether We Should Pay College Athletes,
WASH. SQUARE NEWS (Oct. 18, 2016), https://nyunews.com/2016/10/18/the-multifaceted-debate-of-
whether-we-should-pay-college-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/GD9D-BWDE].
279. Bilas Interview, supra note 32; see also infra notes 281-82.
280. See generally id.
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ings.28 1 Higher ratings could result in even larger television deals, such as
the NCAA's eight-year, $8.8 billion extension with CBS Sports and Turner
Broadcasting System Inc. to broadcast the men's college basketball tourna-
ment that runs through 2032.282
Moreover, by compensating college athletes, the NCAA and confer-
ences avoid or reduce competition and potential competition from other
leagues.28 3 For example, Tom Brady's (quarterback of the New England Pa-
triots in the NFL) agent, Don Yee, plans on starting a football league that
"will pay players straight out of high school and build them up mentally and
physically for an NFL career[.]"28 4 This new league, Pacific Pro, will be
"the first professional football league ever created to provide developing
football players with a choice to play professionally directly from high
school-a league where emerging players can hone their craft, play football,
and be compensated for it." 28 5 Thus, high school athletes will have a choice
of whether to play in college without compensation or in the Pacific Pro
league for compensation.28 6 Even if this league does not succeed, others
may try to improve upon this league with similar leagues of their own.
281. See Andy Schwarz, But Nobody Even Makes Any Money On College Sports, SLATE (Jan. 6,
2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sportsnut/2014/01/paying college athletes_a
point bypointeviscerationof the ridiculous.html [https://perma.cc/E6CU-QLK9] (discussing
the impact of good play on ratings and support, noting that "[e]ven among alumni, the intensity of
fan interest varies greatly based on the quality of the team, which is driven primarily by the quality
of the players").
282. Andy Fixner & Curtis Eichelberger, CBS, Turner Sign $10.8 Billion NCAA Basketball Deal,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2010, 4:07 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-04-22/cbs-
turner-ncaa-in- 14-year- 10-8-billion-pact-for-basketball-toumament; CBS, Turner Sign $8.8 Billion
Extension on NCAA Tournament Broadcast, HUFF. POST (Apr. 12, 2016, 5:27 PM), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/cbs-tumer-sign-88-billion-extension-on-ncaa-toumament-broadcast-us57
0d6470e4b0836057a2bb8c [https://perma.cc/3QQ3-8VGS].
283. See Brandon Wiggins, The NBA G League Announces Salary Raises that Will Likley Entice
More Players to Skip College, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2018, 3:11 PM), https://www.businessinsider
.com/nba-g-league-salary-skip-college-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/MWE9-2H8X].
284. Evan Grossman, Tom Brady's Agent Don Yee Bucks Against Football System and NCAA with
Pacific Pro League, DAILY NEWS (May 27, 2014, 9:34 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/
football/don-yee-bucks-system-ncaa-pacific-pro-football-article-1.3201543 [https://perma.cc/47L2-
ZQDR].
285. Principles, PACIFIC PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.pacificprofootball.com/league/principles/
(last accessed October 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YQ9T-5CVV].
286. See Jarrett Bell, Agent Don Yee Lands Adidas as Sponsor for Pacific Pro Football, USA
TODAY SPORTS (Feb. 28, 2018, 12:09 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/columnist/
bell/2018/02/28/don-yee-pacific-pro-football-league-adidas/281323002/ [https://perma.cc/GU53-M
DPD] ("[P]layers in the future would have the option of bypassing the college game-and get
paid-for the three years after high school until they are eligible for the NFL.").
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The NBA already has a developmental league, the G-League, which
represents the NBA's official minor league with its corporate partner Ga-
torade (hence the G in G-League).28 7 High school graduates are eligible to
play in the G-League because the minimum age requirement is eighteen
years old (as opposed to the NBA's nineteen-year-old requirement).28 8 If
universities and colleges pay college athletes in a free market model, then
potential and current developmental leagues such as the G-League might ei-
ther become less successful or non-existent.28 9 If the NCAA and confer-
ences continue to prohibit payment of college athletes, then these develop-
mental leagues may begin to thrive, and college football and basketball
might lose its best labor and become less relevant and less popular.290
Furthermore, if the plaintiffs in the Jenkins case prevail, then the NCAA
will be forced to allow a free market system for compensating football and
men's college basketball players above their scholarships.291 If those plain-
tiffs do not prevail, then there will undoubtedly be other antitrust cases that
challenge the NCAA's prohibition on compensating college athletes.292 De-
spite the NCAA's previous success in appellate courts on issues relating to
college athletes, it might be just a matter of time before the NCAA's cap on
287. What You Need to Know About the NBA G League, NBA G LEAGUE,
http://gleague.nba.com/about/ (last accessed Oct. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/WRJ2-KSZE].
288. Frequently Asked Questions: NBA G League, NBA G-LEAGUE, https://gleague.nba.com/faq/
(last visited Oct. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2WJA-YNGA]; see also What You Need to Know About
the NBA G-League, supra note 287.
289. See Rob Dauster, Pay Raises Coming to G League Makes Early Entry More Appealing for
Borderline Prospects, NBC SPORTS (Apr. 17, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://www.collegebasketball.
nbcsports.com/2018/04/17pay-raises-coming-to-g-league-makes-early-entry-more-appealing-for-
borderline-prospects/ [https://perma.cc/3N5J-JA4X] (discussing how G-League salaries ometimes
make the difference when choosing between NCAA basketball and the G-League).
290. See Ira Boudway, The NBA 's Minor League Could Soon Transform Pro Basketball,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 20, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features
/2018-06-20/the-nba-s-minor-league-could-soon-transform-pro-basketball [https://perma.cc/X28W-
SK6B] ("If the NBA gets it right, fans who once tuned in to watch James Harden play for the Arizo-
na State Sun Devils will soon be watching the next James Harden play for the Rio Grande Valley
Vipers.").
291. See generally In re Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311
F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015) (discussing how a positive outcome in Jenkins would go against
the NCAA's arguments and allow the free market model to pay athletes over their stipulated scholar-
ships).
292. See Mark Schlabach, Court Strikes Down Payment Plans; Agrees NCAA Violates Antitrust,
ESPN (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/ /id/13777916/appeals-court-
nixes-plan-pay-student-athletes-ed-obannon-case-agrees-ncaa-antitrust-laws [http ://perma.cc/2TC8-
AWRU] (generally discussing the outcomes of O 'Bannon and Jenkins).
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athlete compensation falls. 2 9 3
IV. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE FREE MARKET MODEL
Several of the main arguments against the free market model and re-
sponses thereto have already been discussed above, such as the argument
that the best college football teams will get the better players, which is what
already happens now, creating an imbalance in the competition,294 and dis-
sension amongst teammates will arise when the players start making differ-
ent amounts of money.295 This section addresses two other major arguments
against the free market model: (1) Title IX prevents paying only football and
men's college basketball players; and (2) the model's calculations should
include the value of the players' scholarships. These counterarguments are
addressed below.
293. See John Solomon, Inside College Sports: Here's What's Next for NCAA After O 'Bannon
Ruling, CBSSPORTS.COM (Oct. 2, 2015), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/inside-
college-sports-heres-whats-next-for-ncaa-after-obannon-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/VQ7A-TT7B]
(discussing future implications and cases after O 'Bannon).
294. See supra Section II.D.1.
295. See supra Section II.D.1.
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A. Title IX Prevents Paying Only Football andMen's College Basketball
Players
Antitrust economist Andrew Schwarz skillfully debunked thirteen myths
about paying college athletes, one of which is that paying football and men's
college basketball players will violate Title IX. 2 96 As an initial matter, Title
IX was enacted to ensure equal participation in college sports for men and
women.297 Paying football and men's college basketball players will not
affect women's participation in sports.298 Second, Title IX is currently not
being applied to require equal spending on college sports, which would
entail universities spending equal amounts on men's sports and women's
sports, including coaches' salaries-men's coaches are paid much more than
women's coaches.299
Furthermore, even if Title IX was interpreted to require equal spending
and the government enforced that interpretation, universities could match the
compensation paid to football and men's college basketball players with
funds for women's sports through either alumni or booster donations or a
reallocation of resources, such as coaches' or athletic department salaries or
revenue.30 0 For example, the proposed salary cap for football is $3 million,
meaning a university would need $6 million to compensate the football team
and match that amount by spending $3 million on women's sports.30 1 The
ACC received nearly $90 million from the college football playoff system,
which would almost cover by itself the amount required to compensate every
single scholarship football player in the ACC and the amount required to
spend equally on women's sports (fifteen schools multiplied by $6 million
equals $90 million).30 2 The Big 10 could compensate all of its scholarship
football players and match spending on women's sports with the revenues
from the college football playoff system revenues alone (fourteen teams
multiplied by $6 million equals $84 million), and the Big 10 Conference
would still have $48.5 million remaining from the revenue generated by the





299. Id. at 50-54.
300. Id. at 55-59.
301. Id. at 59-60.
302. Id.
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college football playoff system.30 3  Thus, compensating athletes in the
revenue generating sports (i.e., football and men's college basketball) would
not violate Title IX, and, if it resulted in universities spending substantially
more money on women's athletics, then women's athletics would only
improve.
B. The Free Market Model Calculations Should Include Scholarship
Values
Opponents of compensating college athletes above their scholarship
amounts argue that college athletes already receive nough through their
scholarships, which have value.304 Although scholarships possess value,
they have been awarded to athletes since the 1950s, well before major col-
lege athletics turned into a multibillion dollar industry.30 5 Universities' ath-
letic departments now enjoy vast resources and could compensate college
athletes through a reallocation of their resources, or alumni or booster dona-
tions could pay the compensation earned by athletes.30 6
V. CONCLUSION
Everyone involved in the business of college athletics, except the ath-
letes, receives compensation based on a free market system, upon which this
country's capitalist system operates. The NCAA's cap on athlete compensa-
tion violates antitrust law, and athletes should be allowed to earn their free
market value as everyone else does. A free market approach, as this Article
sets forth in detail, would not only be feasible, but it would likely improve
the product on the field and the court, as well as the lives of those young
men who provide so much excitement and joy to many through their athletic
efforts.
303. See Dosh, supra note 170.
304. See Jeffrey Dofman, Pay College Athletes? They're Already Paid Up To $125,000 Per Year,
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2013/08/29/pay-
college-athletes-theyre-already-paid-up-to-125000year/#c8489c52b828 [https://perma.cc/8RSH-
X3EF] ("Student athletes are already paid and the current system is pretty close to as fair as we are
going to get."); John R. Thelin, Here's Why We Shouldn't Pay College Athletes, TIME (Mar. 1,
2016), http://time.com/money/4241077/why-we-shouldnt-pay-college-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/D8
4W-FD3B] (arguing that a scholarship is better than paying college athletes because of tax benefits).
305. McCormick, supra note 27 (providing that universities formally sanctioned full grant-in-aid
athletic scholarships in 1956).
306. See Nocera, supra note 165 (discussing a plan to pay college athletes with the existing budg-
ets and resources).
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APPENDIX A
Proposed Standard College Athlete Contract
THIS CONTRACT is between [Player's Name], hereinafter "ATHLETE,"
and [Name of University/College], hereinafter "UNIVERSITY," a member
of the National Collegiate Athletics Association, hereinafter "NCAA." In
consideration of the promises made by each to the other, ATHLETE and
UNIVERSITY agree as follows: 30 7
1. TERM. This CONTRACT covers the sport of [Football or Basketball]
and will begin on the date of execution or August _, 20, whichever is
later, and end on May _, 20, unless extended, terminated, or renewed
as specified elsewhere in this CONTRACT. 30 8
2. EMPLOYMENT AND SERVICES. UNIVERSITY employs
ATHLETE as a skilled [Football or Basketball] player. ATHLETE ac-
cepts such employment. ATHLETE agrees to do the following:
a. Meet the admission requirements of the UNIVERSITY; 30 9
b. Report promptly for and participate fully in all UNIVERSITY
meetings and practice sessions, and all preseason, regular sea-
son, and postseason football games scheduled for or by the
UNIVERSITY; 310
c. Meet and maintain the eligibility requirements for athletic par-
ticipation established by the NCAA, the [relevant] Conference,
and the UNIVERSITY; 311
d. Abide by the UNIVERSITY's Athletic Department's academic
standards program as set forth in the student-athlete hand-
book;312
e. Adhere to all rules and policies of the UNIVERSITY's Athletic
Department, including but not limited to team rules, equipment
307. NFL Player Contract, supra note 187.
308. Id. 1.
309. See Sample Athletic Financial Aid Agreement Letter, supra note 188.
310. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187, at ¶ 2.
311. See Sample Athletic Financial Aid Agreement Letter, supra note 188.
312. See id.
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room policies, strength and conditioning program policies, and
medical services policies.3 13
3. OTHER ACTIVITIES. Without prior written consent of the
UNIVERSITY, ATHLETE will not play [Football or Basketball] or en-
gage in activities related to [Football or Basketball] or otherwise engage
in any activity other than [Football or Basketball] for the UNIVERSITY
that may involve a significant risk of personal injury.314
4. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. ATHLETE represents that he has
special, exceptional and unique knowledge, skill, ability, and experience
as a [Football or Basketball] player, the loss of which cannot be estimat-
ed with any certainty and cannot be fairly or adequately compensated by
damages. ATHLETE therefore agrees that UNIVERSITY will have the
right, in addition to any other right that UNIVERSITY may possess, to
enjoin ATHLETE by appropriate proceedings from playing [Football or
Basketball] or engaging in [Football- or Basketball-related] activities
other than for UNIVERSITY during the TERM of this CONTRACT or
from engaging in any activity other than [Football or Basketball] which
may involve a significant risk of personal injury during the TERM of
this CONTRACT. 315
5. PUBLICITY. (a) ATHLETE hereby grants to UNIVERSITY and the
NCAA, separately and together, the right and authority to use, and to au-
thorize others to use solely as described below, his name, nickname, ini-
tials, likeness, image, picture, photograph, animation, persona, auto-
graph/signature (including facsimiles thereof), voice, biographical
information, and/or any and all other identifying characteristics (collec-
tively, "Publicity Rights"), for the following purposes: promoting or ad-
vertising games, ticket sales, game broadcasts and telecasts, program-
ming focused on college [Football or Basketball], one or more
universities and/or their games and events (e.g., coaches' shows, high-
light-based shows, behind-the-scenes programming), other college
[Football or Basketball]-related media offerings (e.g., branded content
segments featuring game footage and other programming enhance-
313. See id.
314. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187, ¶ 3.
315. See generally id. ¶ 3; see also supra note 277 and accompanying text for discussion of the
benefits of requiring players to stay in college longer to avoid violating their contracts.
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ments), media distribution platforms, official events, officially sanc-
tioned awards programs, and public service or community oriented initi-
atives. This use of name, image, and likeness can be accomplished in
any way in any and all media or formats, whether analog, digital, or oth-
er, now known or hereafter developed, including, but not limited to,
print, tape, disc, computer file, radio, television, motion pictures, other
audio-visual and audio works, Internet, broadband platforms, mobile
platforms, applications, and other distribution platforms. Notwithstand-
ing anything to the contrary, the foregoing grant does not confer, during
or after the term of this Agreement, any right or authority to use
ATHLETE's Publicity Rights in a manner that constitutes any endorse-
ment by ATHLETE of a third-party brand, product, or service (En-
dorsement).316 (b) ATHLETE may enter into endorsement deals with
third parties and profit from the use of his name, image, and likeness.317
6. COMPENSATION. For performance of ATHLETE's services and all
other promises of ATHLETE, UNIVERSITY will provide ATHLETE
with the following:
a. A [grant-in-aid scholarship that will cover the ATHLETE's tui-
tion, room, books, and board] [or] [full cost of attendance
scholarship] during the TERM of this CONTRACT.
b. A yearly salary as follows:
$ for the 20 season;
$ for the 20 season;
$ for the 20 season; and
$ for the 20 season.
318
c. In addition, UNIVERSITY will pay ATHLETE such earned
bonuses as may be called for in this CONTRACT under the
Addendum.319
316. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187, at ¶ 4.
317. See Leslie E. Wong, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O'Bannon Takes on the NCAA
For Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete's Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1069,
1074-75 (2013) (noting that currently "[i]n order for a student-athlete to maintain his eligibility sta-
tus ... he may not accept endorsements of any kind from anyone or receive any compensation for
the public use of his personal image").
3 18. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187, at ¶ 5.
319. See id.
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7. PAYMENT. Unless this CONTRACT provides otherwise, ATHLETE
will be paid 100% of his yearly salary under this CONTRACT in equal
weekly or biweekly installments over the course of the applicable school
year, commencing with the first mandatory reporting date. Unless this
CONTRACT specifically provides otherwise, if this CONTRACT is
terminated after the reporting date, the yearly salary payable to
ATHLETE will be reduced proportionately and ATHLETE will be paid
the weekly or biweekly portions of his yearly salary having become due
and payable up to the time of termination. Bonuses will be paid at the
end of the applicable school year or as set forth in the Addendum.320
8. INJURY. Unless this CONTRACT specifically provides otherwise, if
ATHLETE is injured in the performance of his services under this
CONTRACT and promptly reports such injury to the UNIVERSITY
physician or trainer, then ATHLETE will receive such medical and hos-
pital care during the TERM of this CONTRACT as the UNIVERSITY
physician may deem necessary, and will continue to receive his yearly
salary during the season of injury only and for no subsequent period
covered by this CONTRACT if ATHLETE is physically unable to per-
form the services required of him by this CONTRACT because of such
injury. ATHLETE will not lose his scholarship even if he is physically
unable to perform the services required of him during the TERM of this
CONTRACT. 321
9. WORKERS' COMPENSATION. Any compensation paid to
ATHLETE under this CONTRACT for a period during which he is enti-
tled to workers' compensation benefits by reason of temporary total,
permanent total, temporary partial, or permanent partial disability will
be deemed an advance payment of workers' compensation benefits due
ATHLETE, and UNIVERSITY will be entitled to be reimbursed the
amount of such payment out of any award of workers' compensation.32 2
10. FILING. This CONTRACT will be valid and binding upon ATHLETE
and UNIVERSITY immediately upon execution. A copy of this con-
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with the NCAA within 10 days after execution.3 23
11. RECRUITING BAN AFTER SIGNING. All members of the NCAA
are obligated to respect the ATHLETE's signing and shall cease to re-
cruit ATHLETE after signing this CONTRACT. 324
12. COACHING CHANGES. ATHLETE understands he has signed this
CONTRACT with UNIVERSITY and not with a particular coach. If a
coach leaves the UNIVERSITY or the sports program (e.g., not retained
or resigns), ATHLETE remains bound by the provisions of this
CONTRACT. ATHLETE understands it is not uncommon for a coach to
leave his or her coaching position.325
13. CANCELLATION. This CONTRACT may be immediately canceled
during the TERM of this CONTRACT if ATHLETE violates any provi-
sion in paragraphs 2, 3, or 4 within this CONTRACT. This
CONTRACT may also be cancelled if ATHLETE does any of the fol-
lowing: (1) becomes ineligible for intercollegiate competition (for ex-
ample, by carrying less than 12 applicable semester credits); (2) engages
in serious misconduct that brings disciplinary action from the
UNIVERSITY; or (3) voluntarily withdraws from the sport for personal
reasons.326 ATHLETE cannot be terminated for disappointing athletic
performance provided ATHLETE is maintaining himself in excellent
physical condition.327
14. DISPUTES. Any dispute between ATHLETE and UNIVERSITY in-
volving the interpretation or application of any provision of this
CONTRACT will be submitted to final and binding arbitration328 by the
American Arbitration Association under its Commercial Arbitration
Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof 329
323. Id. at¶ 18.
324. See National Letter ofIntent, supra note 188, at ¶ 8.
325. Id. at¶ 11.
326. See Sample Athletic Financial Aid Agreement Letter, supra note 188.
327. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187, at ¶ 19; 2017-18 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
supra note 57, ART. 12.1.2(a); Bilas Interview, supra note 32.
328. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187, at ¶ 19.
329. See generally Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses: A Practical Guide, AM. ARB. ASS'N
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15. NOTICE. Any notice, request, approval, or consent under this
CONTRACT will be sufficiently given if in writing and delivered in
person or mailed (certified or first class) by one party to the other at the
address set forth in this CONTRACT or to such other address as the re-
cipient may subsequently have furnished in writing to the sender.330
16. NO ORAL MODIFICATION OR WAIVER. No modifications or
waivers of any provision in this agreement will be binding or valid un-
less in writing and executed by both parties.33 1
17. INTEGRATION CLAUSE. This CONTRACT, including any attach-
ment to it, sets forth the entire agreement between ATHLETE and
UNIVERSITY and cannot be modified or supplemented orally.
ATHLETE and UNIVERSITY represent that no other agreement, oral
or written, except as attached to or specifically incorporated in this
CONTRACT, exists between them.332
18. LAW. This contract is made under and shall be governed by the laws of
the State of [Name of State where UNIVERSITY is located]. 33 3
19. EXECUTION. THIS CONTRACT is executed in four (4) copies.
ATHLETE acknowledges that before signing this CONTRACT he was
given the opportunity to seek advice from or be represented by persons




lution% o20Clauses%/020A%/`2OPractical%/`2OGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M4B-JQTX] (listing and
discussing common arbitration clauses that can be included in contracts).
330. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187, at ¶ 20.
331. See No Oral Modification Sample Clauses, LAW INSIDER, https://www.lawinsider.com/clause
/no-oral-modifications (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/E6LZ-2XTL].
332. See NFL Player Contract, supra note 187, at ¶ 21.



















White-NCAA; Yellow-ATHLETE; Green-UNIVERSITY; Pink-
ATHLETE'S Agent
ADDENDUM TO CONTRACT BETWEEN ATHLETE AND
UNIVERSITY
SIGNING BONUS
1. As additional consideration for the execution of the CONTRACT for the
TERM, for ATHLETE's matriculating at UNIVERSITY and reporting
260
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to the team upon matriculation, UNIVERSITY agrees to pay ATHLETE
the sum of $ as a signing bonus (Signing Bonus), payable as
follows: 336
Amount: Due and Payable:
$ Within five (5) days after , 20
$ Within five (5) days after , 20 .337
2. It is expressly understood that no part of the Signing Bonus is part of
any salary specified in the CONTRACT, and ATHLETE is entitled to
the Signing Bonus even if the ATHLETE becomes unable to perform
his services because of injury during the TERM of the CONTRACT. 338
PERFORMANCE-BASED BONUS(ES) 33 9
3. ATHLETE will receive [$(_ ] for finishing the season as the team
leader in [(for football) yards passing, yards rushing, yards receiving, to-
tal touchdowns, total scoring, sacks, defensive tackles, tackles for loss-
es, interceptions, pass break-ups, special teams tackles, kickoff return
yardage, and/or punt return yardage] or [(for basketball) points per
game, rebounds, assists, blocked shots, and/or steals].
4. ATHLETE will receive [$(_ ] for reaching [x amount of] [(for
football) rushing yards, touchdowns cored, passing yards, sacks, defen-
sive tackles, tackles for losses, interceptions] or [(for basketball) points
per game, rebounds per game, assists per game, blocked shots per game,
and/or steals per game].
336. See generally NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1573683/000104746913009713/a2216998zex-10_3.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2018) [https://perma.cc/LNM4-YEST] (showing professional football player Arian Foster's previous
contract).
337. Id.at¶ 1.
338. See id. at¶3.
339. See discussion supra Section IIB; see also Joel Corry, Agent's Take: Notable Players Who
Cashed in on Performance Bonuses, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/
nfl/news/agents-take-notable-players-who-cashed-in-on-performance-bonuses [https://perma.cc/V4X
7-2HMH] (showing examples of football players that earned bonuses by reaching performance
thresholds).
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5. ATHLETE will receive the following bonuses if he earns any or all of
the following individual honors:
Honor Bonus340
Heisman Trophy Winner $(
National Player of the Year $(
Conference Player of the Year $(
Conference Offensive Player of the Year $(
Conference Defensive Player of the Year $(
Conference Freshman/Newcomer of the Year $(
All-American First Team $(
All-American Second Team $(
All-American Third Team $(
All-Conference First Team $(
All-Conference Second Team $(
All-Conference Third Team/ $(
Honorable Mention
6. ATHLETE will receive the following bonuses if the team achieves any
or all of the following:
[Football]
Postseason Game Bonus
Conference Championship Game Partici- $(
pant
Conference Championship Game Winner $(
Bowl Game Participant $(




340. The bonuses proposed in the Duke Model range from $1,000 for All-Conference Third
Team/Honorable Mention to $25,000 for the Heisman Trophy Winner. See David A. Grenardo, The
Duke Model: A Performance-Based Solution for Compensating College Athletes, 83 BROOK. L. REV.
157, 193 (2017). These categories come from the Duke Model, but do not represent an exhaustive
list. Universities and athletes would be free to negotiate compensation for any external honors they
wanted.
262




Conference Championship Game Partici- $(
pant
Conference Championship Game Winner $(f)
NCAA Tournament 1s Round Participant $(
NCAA Tournament 2nd Round Participant $(f)
NCAA Tournament Sweet 16 Participant $(f)
NCAA Tournament Elite 8 Participant $(
NCAA Tournament National Semifinalist $(f)
NCAA Tournament National Runner-Up $(




7. ATHLETE will receive the following bonuses if he eams any or all of
the following individual academic honors:
263
341. See discussion supra Section II.B; see also Grenardo, supra note 340, at 199.
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Honor Bonus
Academic All-American First Team $(
Academic All-American Second Team $(
Academic All-American Third Team $(
Academic All-District Team $(
Academic All-Conference $(
264
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APPENDIX B
2017-2018 OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY BUCKEYES FOOTBALL TEAM 3 42
Player Pos. Year Base Sign- Perfor- Rivals Cap Hit
Salary ing mance Rank-
Bonus Bonus ing
Okudah, CB FR 45,000 1,000 1,000 5 Stars $47,000
Jeffrey
Grimes, WR FR 45,000 1,000 1,000 5 Stars $47,000
Trevon
Brown- LB FR 45,000 1,000 1,000 5 Stars $47,000
ing,
Baron
Young, DE FR 45,000 1,000 1,000 5 Stars $47,000
Chase
Jones, LB SO 45,000 1,000 5 Stars $46,000
Keandre
Wade, CB FR 45,000 1,000 1,000 5 Stars $47,000
Shaun
Davis, OL FR 45,000 1,000 1,000 5 Stars $47,000
Wyatt
Bosa, DL SO 45,000 *2,000 5 Stars $46,000
Nick
Dixon, WR JR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Johnnie
Dobbins, RB FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
J.K.
Haskins, QB RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Dwayne FR
Webb, SAF SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Damon
Sheffield, CB SO 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
342. 2017 Ohio State Buckeyes: Roster, Fox SPORTS, https://www.foxsports.com/college-
football/ohio-state-buckeyes-team-roster?season=20 17 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
2VLN-XBPN]; see generally Buckeye Grove, RIVALS, https://ohiostate.rivals.com/content/football
(last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZVQ4-BNU2] (providing general information and star
rankings of Ohio State players and prospects).
265
[Vol. 46: 203, 20191 The Blue Devil's In The Details
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Kendall
Cornell, DT RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Jashon SO
Victor, WR SO 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Binjimen
Riep, CB FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Amir
Holmes, DE SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Jalyn
Mack, WR SO 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Austin
Hill, K.J. WR RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
So
Pryor, SAF FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Isaiah
Davis, DB RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Wayne FR
Barrett, QB SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
J.T.
Baker, LB JR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Jerome
Cooper, DL SO 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Jonathon
Martell, QB FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Tate
Glover- SAF JR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Williams,
Eric
Werner, LB FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Pete
Campbell, WR JR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Paris
William- CB FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
son,
Marcus
Hawkins, TE RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Kierre FR
Weber, RB RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Mike SO IIIII
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Williams, RB SO 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Antonio
McCall, RB FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Demario
Booker, LB SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Dante
Smith, SAF SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Erick
Conner, LB RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Nick SO
Hilliard, LB SO 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Justin
Price, Bil- OL SR 35,000 *2,500 4 Stars $39,000
lyIII
Barrow, DT RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Malik FR
Lewis, DL SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $37,000
Tyguan
Prince, OL JR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Isaiah
Wohlabau OL RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
gh, Jack FR
Pridgeon, OL JR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Malcolm
Burrell, OL RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Matthew SO
Myers, OL FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Josh
Jordan, OL SO 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Michael
Jones, OL SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Jamarco
Feder, OL RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Kevin SO
Hill, DT SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Michael
Knox, OL JR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Demetrius
White, SAF FR 35,000 _ 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
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Brendon
Haus- TE RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
mann, FR
Jake
McLau- WR JR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
rin, Terry
Baugh, TE SR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Marcus
Jones, DL RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Dre'Mont SO
Garrett, DL FR 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Haskell
Farrell, TE RS 35,000 1,000 4 Stars $36,000
Luke FR
Arnette, CB RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Damon SO
Fuller, SAF SO 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Jordan
Hubbard, DE JR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Sam
Burrow, QB RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Joe SO
Ward, CB JR 30,000 *2,500 3 Stars $31,000
Denzel
Berry, TE RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Rashod SO
Harris, WR FR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Jaylen
Wint, SAF RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Jahsen FR
Borland, LB RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Tuf FR
Worley, LB SR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Chris
Harrison, LB SO 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Malik
Slade, DL JR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Darius
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Hamilton, DT RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Davon SO
Alabi, OL RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Joshua SO
Cupp, OL RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Gavin FR
Landers, DL SO 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Robert
Munford, OL FR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Thayer
Bowen, OL RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Branden SO
Taylor, OL JR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Brady
Gardiner, WR FR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Ellijah
Alexan- TE RS 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
der, A.J. SO
Chrisman, P so 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Drue
Sprinkle, DL SR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Tracy
Thomp- DL JR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
son,
Dylan
Haubeil, K FR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Blake
Nuern- K JR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
berger,
Sean
Cage, DL FR 30,000 1,000 3 Stars $31,000
Jerron
McCullou LS RS 20,000 1,000 2 Stars $21,000
gh, Liam SO
Totals 2,905, S6,000 S89,000 S3,000,
000 000
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2017-2018 RICE UNIVERSITY FOOTBALL TEAM34 3
Player Pos. Year Base Sign- Perfor- Rivals Cap
Salary ing mance Rank- Hit
Bonus Bonus ing
I s FR 6000 4
J34 4
dSO 4 Stars $0
345
O R 4 Stars $60,00
US
3 4 6
Walter, WR RS 30,000 3 Stars $30,000
Aston JR
Walter, RB RS 30,000 3 Stars $30,000
Austin JR
Smalls, QB FR 30,000 3 Stars $30,000
Miklo
Orji, DE FR 30,000 3 Stars $30,000
Kenneth
Granato, QB RS 30,000 3 Stars $30,000
J.T. SO
Thomas, SAF RS 30,000 3 Stars $30,000
Cole SR
Thomp- OL RS 30,000 3 Stars $30,000
son, Ken- SR
neth
343. 2017 Football Roster, RICE OwLs, https://riceowls.com/roster.aspx?roster-38&path
=football (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/N47D-SYWY]; see OwlsInsiders.com, RIVALS,
https://rice.rivals.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/U4SM-VZNX] (listing star rank-
ings for Rice football players).
344. Mr. Dobbins is from La Grange, Texas. JK. Dobbins, OHIO STATE BUCKEYES, https://ohio
statebuckeyes.com/roster/j-k-dobbins/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/V9R9-KPU6].
345. Mr. Sheffield hails from Missouri City, Texas. Kendall Sheffield, OHIO STATE BUCKEYES,
http://ohiostatebuckeyes.com/roster/kendall-sheffield/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8Q
F2-XVHN].
346. Mr. Knox comes from Fort Worth, Texas. Demetrius Knox, OHIO STATE BUCKEYES,
https://ohiostatebuckeyes.com/roster/demetrius-knox/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
A278-D36V].
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Abercrum DT RS 30,000 3 Stars $30,000
bia, Zach So
Fox, Jack K JR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Douglas- CB JR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Dotson,
Brandon
Glacs- QB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
mann, FR
Sam
New- DB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
some, FR
Dasharm
Wright, WR RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Lance SR
Bou- WR FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
dreaux,
Chris
White, SAF SR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Destri
Bickham, CB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Justin SO
Myers, WR RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Jordan FR
Mont- WR FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
gomery,
Cameron
Silcox, DB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Dylan FR
Clark, Jo- CB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
nan JR
Trammell, WR FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Austin
Smith, WR RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Parker JR
Ellis, DB SO 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
D'Angelo
Whitaker, RB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Collin FR
Bertrand, DB JR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
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Christian
Tyner, QB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Jackson SO
Akunebu, LB SO 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Uzoma
Blosser, QB FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Robbie
Cum- CB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
mings, SO
Joshua
Ibe, J.T. SAF RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
JR
Granson, WR SO 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Kylen
Thornton, DB FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Tyrac
Banks, CB SR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
V.J.
Marsh- QB FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
man,
Evan
Nyakwol, DB FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
George
Uretsky, LB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Nick SR
Richard- DB FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
son, Isai-
ah
Stewart, RB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Samuel JR
Ellerbe, RB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Nahshon SO
Harrison, K FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Will
Sorensen, WR FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Nicholas
Cephus, WR RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Aaron FR
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Robert, SAF RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Houston SO
Nwakam SAF RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
ma, Mar- JR
tin
Ekpe, An- LB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
thony FR
Esukpa, RB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Emmanu- SO
el
Phillips, TE RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Will FR
Adams, DL SO 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Myles
Wright, DE RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Brady JR
Royall, LB FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Randall
Womac, DE RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Brian SR
Grammer, LB FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Garrett
Green, DJ LB RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
SR
Smith, OL FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Corbin
Godber, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Peter SR
Hubbard, DL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
JaVante FR
Schuman, DE FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Trey
Martin, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Trey SR
Klingler, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Cory JR
Gordon, DT RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
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Preston JR
Baker, OL FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Shea
Ellerbee, LB SR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Emmanu-
el
Mokry, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Crockett SO
Peterson, OL FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Brandt
Anderson, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Calvin JR
MacKel- OL FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
lar, Greg-
or
Greene, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Jack FR
Terrill, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Matt SO
Pierce, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Sam JR
Osuji, OL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Uzoma FR
Dill, Jo- OL SO 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
seph
Sanchez, TE FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Jonathan
Bull, Jae- TE FR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
ger
Long, WR RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Trevor JR
Wells, TE RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Robby SR
Padgett, DE JR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Blain
Thomp- DT JR 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
son, Carl
Garcia, DL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Elijah FR
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Hanusa, DL RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Parker JR
Schantz, DE RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Graysen SR
Wilkins, DT RS 20,000 2 Stars $20,000
Roe SO
Johnson, WR RS 10,000 NA $10,000
Cameron SO
Totals 1,890, S1,890,
000 000
